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A NOTE TO CONGRESS AND THE FDIC: AFTER FIRREA,
WHERE'S THE BIF*
INTRODUCTIONNLTHOUGH the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and En-
Z'orcement Act of 1989 ("FIRREA") is widely recognized as the
"savings and loan bailout bill,"2 many of its provisions deal with com-
mercial banks in addition to their savings-and-loan brethren.3 Specifi-
cally, the bill was intended to place both the Savings Association
Insurance Fund ("SAIF")4 and Bank Insurance Fund ("BIF') 5 "on a
sound financial footing."6
The clear theme of the House Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs
Committee's deliberations was "never again."7 That is, FIRREA was
intended to provide for the "early detection of problems in financial insti-
tutions and the prevention of losses to the deposit insurance funds" and
ultimately to the taxpayer.8 Unfortunately, it appears that unless Con-
gress acts prudently and quickly, "never again" could become "here we
go again," and the taxpayers will be forced to bail out the commercial
* Due to publication constraints, the information in this Note is current only
through March 1991.
1. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L
No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 [hereinafter FIRREA] (to be codified at various sections of 12
& 15 U.S.C.).
2. A purpose of the bill was "[t]o provide funds from public and private sources to
deal expeditiously with failed depository institutions." See id. § 101(8), 103 Stat. at 187;
see also Knight & Walsh, S&L Bailout Set to Go Into High Gear;, $20 Billion to Be Spent
in 7 Weeks on Cleanup of Ailing Thrifts, Wash. Post, Aug. 9, 1989, at Al, col. 3 ("the
savings and loan bailout bill [FIRREA]... launch[es] a seven-week, $20 billion blitz-
kreig to clean up the sickest S&Ls"). But see White, The S&L Debacle, in Annual Survey
of Financial Institutions and Regulation, The S&L Crisis: Death and Transfiguration, 59
Fordhain L. Rev. S57, S61-62 (1991) (disputing that FIRREA was a "bailout").
3. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Chairman L. William Seidman stated
that the effects of FIRREA "go well beyond the closing of insolvent thriftsL-] ... a
changed financial system is in the making." Conferences Highlight Regulatory/Congres-
sional Reactions to FIRREA, [Bulletin 6] Control of Banking (P-H) 6.1, at 1 (Sept. 15,
1989); see, e.g., FIRREA, supra note 1, tits. VIII, IX, XI, 103 Stat. at 441, 446, 511
(provisions dealing with powers applicable to savings and loans as well as commercial
banks); see also infra notes 34-42, 47 and accompanying text (discussing some FIRJREA
provisions that apply to commercial banks).
4. SAIF insures the deposits of savings associations and was created under FIR-
REA. See FIRREA, supra note 1, §§ 205(1)(A)(a)(2), 211(3)(6), 103 Stat. at 194, 219 (to
be codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1814(a)(2), 1821(a)(6)); see also Note, The FDIC's Enhanced
Powers over Saving Associations: Does FIRREA Make it SAIF?, in Annual Survey of Fi-
nancial Institutions and Regulation, The S&L Crisis: Death and Transfiguration, 59
Fordham L. Rev. S381, S387 (1991) (discussing the operation of SAIF).
5. For a discussion of the operation of BIF, see infra notes 30-45 and accompanying
text.
6. FIRREA, supra note 1, § 101(5), 103 Stat. at 187.
7. See H.R. Rep. No. 101-54(1), 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 310 (1989), reprinted in 1989




banking industry and its insurance fund.9
When FIRREA was enacted, Congress correctly viewed the legislation
as only a first step. 10 Senate Banking Committee member Jake Garn
warned, "The 'problem' isn't over.., we still need more deregulation
and modernization of our financial system that will require very careful
oversight and changes."'" It is likely, however, that "[c]oncentration on
the thrift crisis distracted [Congress'] attention from another concern,
the health of our nation's banking system, [specifically] the ability of the
Bank Insurance Fund to withstand [a] sizeable drain upon its
resources."12
In September 1989, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC")
Chairman L. William Seidman testified that he expected BIF "to break
even or show a slight reduction for the full year and to show an increase
in 1990."' 3 Mr. Seidman further stated that "the worst of the problems
in the banking industry are behind us."'" Since these predictions were
made, however, it has become apparent that "[t]he taxpayer is in serious
jeopardy of being asked to bail out the [commercial] banks."'"
In the aftermath of the savings-and-loan crisis, Congress has devoted
9. But see Considine, A State Response to U.S. Treasury Department Proposals to
Modernize the Nation's Banking System, in Annual Survey of Financial Institutions and
Regulation, The S&L Crisis: Death and Transfiguration, 59 Fordhan L. Rev. S243, S252
(1991) (assessing state of commercial banks and comparing with state of S&Ls); Felsen-
feld, The Savings and Loan Crisis--Yet Another Analysis, in Annual Survey of Financial
Institutions and Regulation, The S&L Crisis: Death and Transfiguration, 59 Fordham L.
Rev. S7 (1991) (same).
10. See, eg., FIRREA, supra note 1, § 1001, 103 Stat. at 507 (ordering various regu-
lators to study federal deposit-insurance system); id. § 1003, 103 Stat. at 509 (ordering
Comptroller General of the United States to study deposit insurance issues).
11. Conferences Highlight Regulatory/Congressional Reactions to FIRREA, [Bulletin
6] Control of Banking (P-H) 6.1, at 2 (Sept. 15, 1989).
House Banking Committee member John LaFalce similarly recognized that FIRREA
"marks the beginning rather than the end of a long policy process... which will change
the shape of the financial services industry." Id.
12. Hearings on Deposit Insurance Before the Financial Institutions Subcomm. of the
House Banking Comm., 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (Sept. 19, 1989) (Panel one) [hereinafter
Deposit Insurance Hearings 1] (statement of Rep. Annunzio, Chairman) (LEXIS, Nexis
library, Fednews file).
Apparently, Congress did not fully comprehend the extent of the problems facing the
commercial banks because it created a structure for the savings and loans similar to that
which existed for the commercial banks and placed control of the savings association's
deposit-insurance fund with the deposit-insurance regulator of the commercial banks, the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. See, eg., FIRREA, supra note 1, § 202, 103
Stat. at 188 (adding "savings associations" as institutions subject to the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation); Note, The FDIC's Enhanced Powers over Saving Associations:
Does FIRREA Make it SAIF?, in Annual Survey of Financial Institutions and Regula-
tion, The S&L Crisis: Death and Transfiguration, 59 Fordham L. Rev., at S387 (1991)
(discussing FIRREA's regulatory restructuring of savings associations).
13. Regulators Paint Rosy BIF Picture; Academics, GAO See Growing Problems, 53
Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 12, at 415 (Sept. 25, 1989).
14. Id.
15. A More Pessimistic View of Bank Deposit Insurance Fund, N.Y. Times, Oct. 11,
1990, at D2, col. 2 (quoting Rep. Annunzio).
S412 [Vol. 59
BANK INSURANCE FUND
significant resources to exploring the problems of the banking industry,
especially with respect to commercial banks. This Note examines the
crisis facing the commercial banking industry. Part I reviews BIFs es-
tablishment and operation, including forecasts concerning the health of
the fund and the banking industry. Part II analyzes many of the propos-
als for deposit insurance and industry reform, evaluating the benefits and
drawbacks of each proposal in light of the overall goal of restoring the
banking industry and the deposit-insurance fund to a sound financial
footing. This Note concludes that Congress must act quickly and force-
fully to prevent the need for a costly rescue of the banking industry.
I. THE CRISIS
A. Background
Banking institutions 6 are regulated by various federal and state agen-
cies, including state bank supervisors, the Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency, the Federal Reserve Board and the FDIC.17 These regula-
tory bodies exercise overlapping levels of jurisdiction,' 8 a structure that
has been aptly described as a "bankers [sic] nightmare and a lawyer's
dream."
19
The bulk of the FDIC's regulatory authority stems from its mandate
16. Throughout this Note, the terms "banking institutions" and "banks" refer to
commercial banks. A commercial bank is traditionally defined "as an institution whose
business consists of discounting commercial paper, accepting deposits (particularly de-
mand deposits), and making loans (particularly commercial loans)." . Malloy, I The
Corporate Law of Banks § 1.2.2, at 11 (1988) (footnotes omitted).
In contrast, for purposes of this Note, the terms "savings and loans CS&Ls')," "savings
banks," "savings associations" and "thrifts" refer to non-commercial institutions. For
FIRREA's statutory definition of savings associations, see FIRREA, supra note I,
§ 204(b), 103 Stat. at 190-91 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1813(b)); see also Malloy,
Nothing to Fear but FIRREA Itsefi Revising and Reshaping the Enforcement Process of
Federal Bank Regulation, 50 Ohio St. LJ. 1117, 1117 n.2 (1989) (discussing the legal
definitions of savings associations).
The term "depository institutions" is used to describe commercial banks, credit unions
and savings associations. See 12 U.S.C. § 461(b)(1)(A) (1988); see also FIRREA, supra
note 1, § 204(c)(c)(1), 103 Stat. at 191 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1813(c)(1)) (limiting
definition of "depository institutions" to S&Ls and banks for purposes of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Act).
17. See generally M. Malloy, 1 The Corporate Law of Banks § 1.3 (1988) (analyzing
roles of the various banking regulators).
18. See id. at 23-25.
19. Hearings, Oversight on the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforce-
ment Act Before the Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance Sub-
comm. of the House Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs Comm., 101st Cong., 2d Sess.
25 (Mar. 14, 1990) [hereinafter Oversight Hearings] (statement of Rep. Parris) (LEXIS,
Nexis library, Fednews file).
Representative Parris named over a dozen federal regulatory offices, in addition to the
fifty state agencies, in a "laundry list" of regulators having some involvement with the
banking and savings industries. See id
1991] S413
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to insure the deposits of all insured banks.2 0 If an insured bank is closed
after being declared insolvent, the FDIC is responsible for paying insured
depositors.2 Additionally, the FDIC can be appointed conservator by a
bank's primary regulator22 and can act as receiver of a bank in receiver-
ship. 3 The FDIC also has the authority to take remedial action to pre-
vent the formal closing of an insured bank,24 to organize bridge banks to
assume the deposits, liabilities and assets of a bank that is in default or
may default,25 and to terminate the insurance of a bank whose current or
anticipated activities are considered "unsafe or unsound"26 or that pres-
ent "a serious threat" to BIF.2 To evaluate the need for such action, the
FDIC has broad authority to conduct examinations of any insured
bank.28
The FDIC administers two insurance funds, SAIF29 and BIF.30 The
latter insures the deposits of approximately 13,000 institutions, 3I ninety-
five percent of which are commercial banks.32 The remainder of the in-
sured banks are "federally and state-chartered savings banks and
branches of foreign banks that conduct consumer business in this coun-
try."' 33 BIF was established in 1989 by FIRREA34 to replace the Perma-
20. See 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (1988) (amended by FIRREA, supra note 1, § 202(a), 103
Stat. at 188).
An insured bank is any bank "the deposits of which are insured in accordance with
[the FDIC Act]." 12 U.S.C. § 1813(h) (1988).
While the FDIC is considered the primary regulator of both state non-member insured
banks and foreign banks having an insured branch in this country (except for district
banks), see 12 U.S.C. § 1813(q)(3) (1988), this Note will consider the FDIC's regulatory
powers of the banking industry that exist through its protection of the insurance funds,
specifically BIF.
21. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 212(a)(f), 103 Stat. at 240 (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1821(f)).
22. See id. § 212(a)(c)(2)(A)(i), 103 Stat. at 222 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1821(c)(2)(A)(i)).
23. See id. § 212(a)(c)(2)(A)(ii), 103 Stat. at 222 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1821(c)(2)(A)(ii)).
24. See 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c) (1988) (amended by FIRREA, supra note 1, §§ 201(a)(1),
217(3), 103 Stat. at 187, 255).
25. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 214, 103 Stat. at 246 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1821(n)).
26. Id. at § 926(1)(a)(2), 103 Stat. at 489 (to be codified 12 U.S.C. § 1818(a)(2)).
27. Id. § 221(4)(m)(3)(C), 103 Stat. at 268 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1828(m)(3)(C)).
28. See id. § 210(a)(b), 103 Stat. at 217 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1820(b)).
29. See sources cited supra note 4.
30. See id. § 211(3)(4), 103 Stat. at 218 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(4)); see
also infra notes 37-42 and accompanying text (differentiating between the two insurance
funds).
31. As of June 30, 1990, BIF insured 12,977 banks. See Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, Board Briefing: Bank Insurance Fund Mid-Year Results 1990, 2 (June 30,
1990) [hereinafter Mid-Year Report].
32. See Statement of Robert D. Reischauer, Director, Congressional Budget Office,
Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs I (Sept. 12, 1990)
(Congressional Budget Office press release) [hereinafter Reischauer Senate Testimony].
33. Id. at 1-2.
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nent Insurance Fund, which the FDIC had previously operated.3"
Pursuant to FIRREA, BIF assumed all the assets and liabilities of its
predecessor.36
Despite concomitant administration of the insurance funds, BIF and
SAIF are "maintained separately and not commingled. ' 37 All costs, ex-
penses and receipts associated with savings associations insured by SAIF
and banks insured by BIF are separately charged a.3  Additionally, for the
five-year period following the passage of FIRREA,39 a depository institu-
tion may not change its membership from BIF to SAIF or vice versa
unless the FDIC approves the conversion.' To approve the conversion,
the FDIC must determine that only an "insubstantial portion" of the
total deposits are affected a" or that the conversion is related to the acqui-
sition of a troubled member of the alternate insurance fund.42
BIF derives its income "primarily from assessments on insured
banks' 43 and "from the sale of assets of failed banks." 44 It also receives
interest income from its cash balances, which are invested in Treasury
34. FIRREA, supra note 1, § 211(3)(5)(A), 103 Stat. at 219 (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1821(a)(5)(A)).
35. See id. § 211(3)(5)(B), 103 Stat. at 219 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1821(a)(5)(B)).
36. See id.
37. Id. § 211(3)(4)(B), 103 Stat. at 219 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(4)(B)).
38. See id. § 211(3)(7)(B)(iv), 103 Stat. at 221 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1821(a)(7)(B)(iv)); see also id. § 211(3)(7)(C), 103 Stat. at 221 (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1821(a)(7)(C)) (allocating personnel, administrative or other overhead expenses
to the fund from which the expenses were incurred).
39. Id. § 206(a)(7)(d)(2)(A)(ii), 103 Stat. at 197 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1815(d)(2)(A)(ii)).
40. See id. §§ 206(a)(7)(d)(2)(A)(i), 206(a)(7)(d)(2)(B)(i), 103 Stat. at 197, 197 (to be
codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1815(d)(2)(A)(i), 1815(d)(2)(B)(i)).
Conversion is defined as "the change of status of an insured depository institution from
a [BIF] member to a [SAIF] member or from a [SAIE] member to a [BIF] member," id.
§ 206(a)(7)(d)(2)(B)(i), 103 Stat. at 197 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1815(d)(2)(B)(i)), or
"the merger or consolidation of a [BIF] member with a [SAIF] member." Id.
§ 206(a)(7)(d)(2)(B)(ii), 103 Stat. at 197 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1815(d)(2)(B)(h)).
41. Id. § 206(a)(7)(d)(2)(C)(i), 103 Stat. at 197 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1815(d)(2)(C)(i)).
42. See id. §§ 206(a)(7)(d)(2)(C)(ii)-(iii), 103 Stat. at 197-98 (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1815(d)(2)(C)(ii)-(ii)); see also Note, The FDIC's Enhanced Powers over Saving
Associations: Does FIRREA Make it SALF?, in Annual Survey of Financial Institutions
and Regulation, The S&L Crisis: Death and Transfiguration, 59 Fordham L Rev., at
S388-89 (1991) (discussing membership transfer regulations).
43. Reischauer Senate Testimony, supra note 32, at 2; see also 12 U.S.C. 1817(c)
(1988) (amended by FIRREA, supra note 1, §§ 201(a)(1), 208(7), 103 Stat. at 187, 213)
(describing assessments).
The BIF assessment rate is a premium assessed on each $100 of a member bank's
insured deposits. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 208(4)(1)(C), 103 Stat. at 208 (to be
codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b)(1)(C)). The method of calculating deposits is provided by
12 U.S.C. § 1817(b)(4) (1988) (amended by FIRREA, supra note 1, § 208(6), 103 Stat. at
212-13).
Congress set BIF assessment rates at 8.5 cents for the remainder of 1989, see FIRREA,
supra note 1, § 208(4)(1)(C)(i), 103 Stat. at 208 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.




BIF's financial condition and viability are measured by two basic in-
dicators. The first is the fund's balance on either an accrual or cash ba-
sis.' The second is the fund's "reserve ratio. 47
If BIF were to become insolvent, the taxpayers, as insurers of last re-
sort, would need to provide money to bail it out. Accordingly, because
the banking industry dwarfs the thrift industry in size,4" a banking crisis
could have much greater consequences than did the savings-and-loan
debacle.
codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b)(1)(C)(ii)), and 15 cents on and after January 1, 1991. See
id. § 208(4)(1)(C)(ii), 103 Stat. at 208 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b)(1)(C)(iii)).
Additionally, Congress provided that if the FDIC determines that a higher assessment
rate is warranted, it may increase the rates, see id. § 208(4)(1)(C3(iv), 103 Stat. at 208 (to
be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b)(1)(C)(iv)), up to a maximum of 32.5 cents, see Id.
§ 208(4)(1)(C)(iv)(II), 103 Stat. at 209 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b)(1)(C)(iv)
(II)), with the increase in any one year not to exceed 7.5 cents. See id. § 208(4)(1)(C)(iv)
(I11), 103 Stat. at 209 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b)(1)(C)(iv)(IllI)). But see infra
notes 138-142 and accompanying text (Congress considering legislation to remove ceil-
ings on assessment rates).
For 1990, the FDIC has raised the BIF assessment rate to its statutory maximum of
19.5 cents. See Nash, Banks' Payments to Insure Deposits May Jump By 30%, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 15, 1990, at Al, col. 3.
44. Reischauer Senate Testimony, supra note 32, at 2; see FIRREA, supra note 1,
§ 217(4)(d), 103 Stat. at 256 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. 1823(d)).
45. See 12 U.S.C. § 1823(a) (1988) (amended by FIRREA, supra note 1, § 217(1)(a),
103 Stat. at 254-55); Reischauer Senate Testimony, supra note 32, at 2.
46. The FDIC uses an accrual basis to report its net income. The fund's accrual
balance represents the "accumulated net worth of the fund." Reischauer Senate Testi-
mony, supra note 32, at 2. Under this accounting method, the FDIC subtracts its ex-
penses and provisions for expected losses from the fund's balance and revenue. See Id.;
see also Mid-Year Report, supra note 31, at 4 (showing the calculation of the fund's
unaudited accrual balance as of June 30, 1990). The estimated loss figure is reduced by
expected future income from asset dispositions. See Reischauer Senate Testimony, supra
note 32, at 2.
In contrast, the federal budget records the FDIC balance on a cash basis, that is, re-
flecting the receipts and payouts as they occur. See id. at 3. In the short term, a shortage
of cash could hinder the FDIC's ability to finance the acquisition of assets. See id.
47. The BIF reserve ratio is defined as "the ratio of the net worth of [BIF] to the
value of the aggregate estimated insured deposits held in all [BIF] members." FIRREA,
supra note 1, § 208(14)()(6), 103 Stat. at 214 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1817(l)(6)).
The net worth of the fund represents the fund's accrual balance. See id.
§ 208(4)(l)(C)(iv), 103 Stat. at 208 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b)(1)(C)(iv); supra
note 46; see also Mid-Year Report, supra note 31, at I (indicating $1,988 billion in depos-
its are insured by $11,375 million, the fund's accrual balance, for a ratio of 0.60%).
In FIRREA, Congress designated that the fund's target reserve ratio shall be 1.25%,
or $1.25 for every $100 in bank deposits. See id. § 208(4)(1)(B)(i)(I), 103 Stat. at 207 (to
be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b)(1)(B)(i)(I)).
FIRREA also provided for the maximum reserve ratio of BIF to be 1.50%. See id.
§ 208(4)(1)(B)(i)(II), 103 Stat. at 207 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b)(1)(B)(i)(II)).
There are, however, proposals that would remove BIF's maximum reserve ratio. See
infra text accompanying notes 151-153.
48. The BIF-member banks have over three trillion dollars in assets, which is two and
one-half times the assets held by the thrift industry. See Deposit Insurance Hearings 1,




Until recent years, the FDIC bank-insurance operations consistently
generated more revenue than expenses. 9 This growth occurred even
though the FDIC regularly rebated a portion of the banks' assessment
payments5' and resolved an average of twenty-four failing banks per
year.51
The increasing number of bank failures indicates the escalating
problems of the insurance fund. During the forty-six-year period from
the 1934 creation of the FDIC5 2 through 1979, a total of 558 FDIC-
insured banks failed. 3 In contrast, during the nine-year period from
1980 through 1988, 879 banks failed or needed assistance, including over
four hundred in the last two years alone.' Furthermore, as of June 30,
1990, the FDIC considered over one thousand banks to be "problem
banks,"' 55 that is, "banks that are perceived as unusually weak" and in
danger of failing or requiring assistance.5 6
In 1988, the FDIC insurance fund experienced the first loss in its his-
tory57 when it paid out over seven billion dollars resulting in a net loss of
$4.2 billion.58 The losses continued into 1989, when the fund recorded a
net loss of $851 million.59 At the end of 1989, BIF had an accrual bal-
49. From 1970 to 1985, the FDIC fund's accrual balance grew from S3.9 billion to
$19.5 billion as the FDIC generated net income each year, including $2.8 billion in 1985.
See Reischauer Senate Testimony, supra note 32, at 3.
50. See id.; see also 12 U.S.C. § 1817(e) (1988) (amended by FIRREA, supra note 1,
§ 201(a)(1), 103 Stat. at 187) (authorizing the FDIC to issue rebates to insured banks).
51. See Reischauer Senate Testimony, supra note 32, at 3.
52. See Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, § 8, 48 Stat. 162, 168 (1933).
53. See Hearings on Deposit Insurance Before The Financial Institutions Subcomm. of
the House Banking Comm., 101st Cong., Ist Sess. 2 (Sept. 19, 1989) (Panel two) [herein-
after Deposit Insurance Hearings I1] (statement of Robert Gramling, Director, Corporate
Financial Audits, Accounting and Financial Management Division of the United States
GAO) (LEXIS, Nexis library, Fednews file); see also Testimony of L. William Seidman,
Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, on Deposit Insurance Revision and
Financial Services Restructuring Before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs, app. I at fig. I (July 31, 1990) (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
press release) [hereinafter Seidman I] (graph depicting number of failed banks per year
from 1934 to 1989).
54. See Deposit Insurance Hearings II, supra note 53, at 2 (statement of Robert Gram-
ling, Director, Corporate Financial Audits, Accounting and Financial Management Divi-
sion of the United States GAO); see also Seidman I, supra note 53, app. I at fig. I (graph
of number of failed banks per year including the years 1985 to 1989).
55. See Mid-Year Report, supra note 31, at 2.
56. Flannery, Can State Bank Examination Data Replace FDIC Examination Visits?,
J. Bank Res., at 312 (Winter 1983).
57. See Reischauer Senate Testimony, supra note 32, at 5 table 2.
58. See Mid-Year Report, supra note 31, at 2.
59. See id.
Recognizing problems seems to be difficult for the regulators. For example, in early
December 1989, BIF was expected to show losses between $250 million and $500 million
for the year. See BIF Reserves Will Drop By $250 Million in 1989, FDIC Chairman
Seidman Predicts, 53 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 23, at 868 (Dec. 11, 1989). Chairman
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ance of $13.2 billion'o and a cash balance of $15.1 billion.6'






* Indicates figures are estimates.
Sources: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Board Briefing: Bank Insurance
Fund Mid-Year Results 1990 (June 30, 1990); N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1990, at
Al, col. 6; Wall St. J., Dec. 12, 1990, at A2, col. 2.
reserve ratio has also been falling steadily. The ratio peaked at 1.3% in
198562 and fell to 0.70% by the end of 1989.63
The FDIC estimated that during 1990 BIF would continue to incur
losses totalling three billion dollars' despite significantly increased as-
sessments. 65 These estimates were based on losses experienced by BIF
through June 30, 1990.66 Moreover, the FDIC's mid-year report indi-
Seidman characterized this loss as "slight," to which Representative Annunzio replied,
"Only in Washington could someone term a half billion dollar loss 'slight.'" Id.
60. See Mid-Year Report, supra note 31, at 2.
61. See Reischauer Senate Testimony, supra note 32, at 3; see also figure 1.
62. See Reischauer Senate Testimony, supra note 32, at 5.
63. See Mid-Year Report, supra note 31, at 2.
64. See Labaton, Deposit Fund Condition is Worsening, N.Y. Times, Sept. 29, 1990, at
Dl, col. 6; Thomas, FDIC Increases Loss Projection to $3 Billion, Wall St. J., Sept. 28,
1990, at A2, col. 1.
65. See supra note 43.
66. Up to that point in 1990, the FDIC had handled 103 bank failures and had $3.7
billion in expenses. See Mid-Year Report, supra note 31, at 2.
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cated that BIFs reserve ratio had reached an all-time low of 0.60%.'
The FDIC expected the ratio to continue to fall and, by year's end, to
reach a balance of only fifty cents for every one hundred dollars in depos-
its, a ratio of 0.50%.68
Indicative of the continuing deterioration of BIF, in December 1990,
the FDIC was again forced to revise its estimates and predicted that BIF
would lose four billion dollars or more during 1990.69 Losses of this
magnitude would lower BIF's accrual balance to about nine billion dol-
lars and its cash balance to about seven billion dollars. 0 Since BIF in-
sures $2.3 trillion in deposits,7 ' its reserve ratio would fall to 0.39%. BIF
is expected to face these record losses despite a decreasing number of
bank failures. 72
The FDIC has preliminarily estimated that BIF will lose five billion
dollars in 1991. 71 These loses would be incurred in dealing with 170 to
200 failing banks74 and result in BIF's reserve ratio falling to eighteen
cents for every hundred dollars in deposits.75 If these estimates are accu-
rate, BIF will have a loss for the fourth consecutive year and the worst in
the fund's history.76 Such a loss, combined with the expected 1990
losses, would leave BIF with an accrual balance of about four billion
dollars.77
67. See id.
68. See Labaton, Deposit Fund Condition is Worsening, N.Y. Times, Sept. 29, 1990, at
D6, col. 6.
69. See Bacon, Bank Insurance Fund '90 Losses Put at $4 Billion, Wall St. J., Dec. 12,
1990, at A2, col. 2; Labaton, $4 Billion Loss Seen by F.D.L C, N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1990,
at Dl, col. 3. This represents a one billion dollar increase from the FDIC's June projec-
tions, see supra note 64 and accompanying text, and double its early September predic-
tions. See Bacon, Bank Insurance Fund '90 Losses Put at $4 Billion, Wall St. J., Dec. 12,
1990, at A2, col. 2.
70. See Bacon, Bank Insurance Fund '90 Losses Put at $4 Billion, Wall St. J., Dec. 12,
1990, at A2, col. 2; Labaton, $4 Billion Loss Seen by F.D.L C, N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1990,
at D1, col. 3; see also figure 1.
71. See Bacon, Bank Insurance Fund '90 Losses Put at $4 Billion, Wall St. J., Dec. 12,
1990, at A2, col. 2.
72. In 1990, 169 banks failed, see Bank Failures, Dip for Now, N.Y. Tunes, Jan. 1,
1991, at 42, col. 4, with assets totalling $16 billion. See Bacon, As Deposit Insurance
Dwindles; FDIC Wonders if it Should Start Running the Banks it Seizes, Wall St. J., Dec.
31, 1990, at 30, col. 3. This represents a 29% drop from 1989. See Bank Failures; Dip for
Now, N.Y. Times, Jan. 1, 1991, at 42, col. 4.
73. See Labaton, $5 Billion '91 Loss Seen for US Fund Insuring Deposits, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 17, 1990, at Al, col. 6.
74. See id.; see also Bacon, As Deposit Insurance Dwindles; FDIC Wonders if it Should
Start Running the Banks it Seizes, Wall St. J., Dec. 31, 1990, at 30, col. 3 (it is expected
that the average failed bank will be larger than it was in 1990).
75. See Labaton, $5 Billion '91 Loss Seen for U.S. Fund Insuring Deposits, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 17, 1990, at D4, col. 1.
76. See id.
77. See Bacon, FDIC Says Insurance Fund Will Shrink to $4 Billion in 91 Without an
Infusion, Wall St. J., Dec. 17, 1990, at A4, col. 1; Labaton, $5 Billion '91 Loss Seen for
U.S. Fund Insuring Deposits, N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1990, at Al, col. 6.
Subsequently, the FDIC acknowledged that it may need to borrow SlO billion this
year, see Labaton, U.S. Seeks Much Bigger Amount to Shore Up Bank Deposit Fund, N.Y.
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While the FDIC has not made forecasts for BIF beyond the year's end,
the Office of Management and Budget ("OMB"), the Congressional
Budget Office ("CBO"), the General Accounting Office ("GAO") and a
House subcommittee have made projections that raise serious questions
regarding BIF's health.
The OMB estimated that BIF will lose $6.1 billion through 1993,78
even if bank premiums continue to rise.79 Under these projections, BIF
will show an accrual balance of $5.3 billion by September 30, 1993 and
have a reserve ratio of only 0.22%.80 While the FDIC views these figures
as "pessimistic" and "possible, but not likely," ' the "projections are
doubly alarming when you realize that they are based on economic as-
sumptions that do not include a recession." 2
The CBO's estimates are slightly more optimistic. Assuming that
BIF's premiums remain at their 1991 level, the CBO estimated that BIF
would show twelve billion dollars in net income by 1993 and would have
both a twelve billion dollar accrual balance and a 0.50% reserve ratio by
1995.83 BIF's cash on hand, however, would decrease to about seven
billion dollars. The low cash balance reflects the increasing amount of
assets that the FDIC would acquire from case resolutions.8 4 Further-
more, the CBO estimates do not include "additional potential liabilities
... that could result from previous case resolutions."8 5 The CBO report
indicates that these commitments, which stem from FDIC guarantees
made when transferring assets to acquiring institutions, could require ad-
ditional cash outlays of about eight billion dollars.8 6 Additionally, like
the OMB's estimates, the CBO's figures do not account for the slower
economic growth that the CBO itself admitted seemed likely8 7 and has in
Times, Mar. 22, 1991, at D6, col. 1, indicating that it may be predicting that BIF will
have a zero or negative cash balance by the end of the year. See Labaton, Big Loan Is
Proposed For F.D.LC., N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1991, at DI, col. 6.
78. See A More Pessimistic View of Bank Deposit Insurance Fund, N.Y. Times, Oct.
11, 1990, at D2, col. 1.
79. The OMB assumed that the premium would rise from the 19.5 cents scheduled
for 1991 to 23 cents in 1992 and 1993. See id. at D2, col. 4.
80. See id. at D2, col. 3.
81. Id. at D2, col. 2 (quoting Mr. Roger Watson, research director of FDIC).
82. Id. at D2, col. 3 (quoting Rep. Annunzio, the chairman of the House Banking
Financial Institutions Subcommittee).
83. See Reischauer Senate Testimony, supra note 32, at 7.
84. See id; see also figure 2.
The CBO is predicting that the amount of asset acquisitions will continue to rise. See
Reischauer Senate Testimony, supra note 32, at 7. When the FDIC manages a failed
bank, it acquires assets other than cash from its liquidation. While these assets are not
part of the FDIC's available cash resources, they are included in BIF's balance. See Mid-
Year Report, supra note 31, at 5. For example, the FDIC owns 12% of the Dallas Cow-
boys, see Deposit Insurance Hearings I, supra note 12, at 17 (statement of Rep. Annun-
zio), and, although the team is probably not generating much income, the value of the
asset is included in BIF's balance.
85. Reischauer Senate Testimony, supra note 32, at 14.
86. See id.; see also figure 2.
87. See Reischauer Senate Testimony, supra note 32, at 13.
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FIG. 2
*Based on additional liabilities CBO believes BIF might incur.
Sources: Statement of Robert D. Reischauer, Director, Congressional Budget Office
Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs; (Sept. 12.
1990) (Congressional Budget Office press release).
fact occurred."8 Finally, the CBO warned that the failure of a single
large bank"9 or any loss greater than one percent of insured deposits'
could exhaust the fund's cash resources.91
The GAO indicated that while BIF was not technically insolvent,
under a "'more realistic [accounting] standard,"' several billion dollars
should have been reserved as liabilities.92 Such a reserve would have de-
pleted BIF's 1989 accrual balance.93 The GAO's study noted that the
FDIC's calculations did not reflect the eight billion dollars that may be
needed to repurchase assets from the acquisitions of southwestern
88. See Murray, White House's Forecast Admits US is in Recession, Wall St. J., Jan.
2, 1991, at A3, col. 1; Rosenbaum, The White House Agreear It's a Recession, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 3, 199 1, at DI, col. 3.
89. See Reischauer Senate Testimony, supra note 32, at 17.
90. See Statement of Robert D. Reischauer, Director, Congressional Budget Office,
Before the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs 5 (Sept. 26, 1990)
(Congressional Budget Office press release) [hereinafter Reischauer House Testimony].
91. See id.; Reischauer Senate Testimony, supra note 32, at 17.
92. See Labatan, A4 Bleaker Forecast Made For US. Fund That Insures Banks, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 12, 1990, at Al, D4, cal. 1, 4 (quoting testimony by Comptroller General
Bowsher).
93. See id. at Al, col. 1.
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banks.94 Nor did the calculations include the $4.4 billion to $6.3 billion
that will be required to cover claims on deposits in thirty-five large banks
that have failed, are likely to fail, or will require assistance in the next
year. 9" Disagreeing with the GAO's forecast, Mr. Seidman, the FDIC
chairman, said that "[t]he G.A.O. figures had looked at potential losses
without considering the income [BIF] would be getting from the sale of
assets at failed institutions and the rise in premiums." 96 Mr. Seidman
further asserted that BIF "will be able to meet its obligations. 97
By far the gloomiest forecast was presented in a May 1990 study com-
missioned by the House Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation
and Insurance Subcommittee.9" The study estimated that if bank premi-
ums remained at their current level of 19.5 cents per $100 in deposits,
BIF would have approximately twenty-eight billion dollars to resolve
failed banks over the next three years. 99 If the premiums rise to twenty-
three cents, BIF would have thirty-one billion dollars in resources over
the next three years."°  Using these estimates, the study explored
whether this amount of money would be sufficient to cover the costs of
expected failures.10 1
Three possible three-year scenarios, each based on a different level of
recession, were simulated.) Under the "highest" level, the researchers
assumed that all the banks in the country would suffer the same level of
deterioration as the Texas banks experienced and determined that BIF
would face costs between twenty-eight and sixty-three billion dollars. 103
Under the "middle" scenario, all banks would suffer the same deteriora-
tion level as the New England banks experienced through June 30,
94. Hearings on the Bank Industry Condition Before the Senate Comm. on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8 (Sept. 11, 1990) [hereinafter Indus-
try Condition Hearings] (statement of Mr. Bowsher, United States Comptroller General)
(LEXIS, Nexis library, Fednews file).
95. See id. at 7.
96. Labaton, A Bleaker Forecast Made For U.S. Fund That Insures Banks, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 12, 1990, at D4, cols. 4-5.
97. Id. at D4, col. 5; see also Bacon, Bank Insurance Fund '90 Losses Put at $4 Bil-
lion, Wall St. J., Dec. 12, 1990, at A2, col. 2 (despite increased loss estimates, Seidman
continues to assert that BIF has adequate assets).
98. See Hearings on the Bank Insurance Fund Before the Financial Institutions Super-
vision, Regulation and Insurance Subcomm. of the House Banking Committee, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (Dec. 17, 1990) [hereinafter Bank Insurance Fund Hearings] (statement
by Rep. Annunzio) (LEXIS, Nexis library, Fednews file).
The study was completed by Dr. R. Dan Brumbaugh, Jr., Dr. Robert E. Litan, and
Professor James Barth, all of whom correctly forecast the problems currently being faced
by the savings-and-loan industry. See id. at 4, 11 (statement by Rep. Annunzio).
99. See id. at 14 (statement by Mr. Litan).
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. See id. at 17.




1990,"°4 and BIF would require twenty-five to fifty billion dollars to re-
solve failures.I 5 Finally, under the "mildest" scenario, which assumes a
slight recession," BIF would face expenses in the range of twenty to
forty-three billion dollars.' 0 7
Because the authors believe that their calculations are conservative,108
they estimate that BIF's actual expenses will likely fall in the "midpoint
to high range" of their calculations." 9 This means that BIF would re-
quire revenue of thirty-one to forty-three billion dollars to cover its ex-
penses adequately." 0 Several factors support this contention that BIF's
costs will be at the high end of the estimates. First, one of the study's
authors noted that the estimates were based on "reported accounting
data, recent FDIC closure rates and recent FDIC closure costs""II even
though experience with the savings-and-loan crisis indicates that these
figures underestimate actual costs." 2 Second, at least two large banks
have recently been able to raise their capital to levels considered healthy
by regulators by improving their earnings with "one-time extraordinary
gains""' 3 that only serve "to obscure deterioration through account-
ing."" 4 Third, the authors used data from June 30, 1990 and the "num-
bers seem to be getting worse since then.""' 5 Fourth, because the
country has entered a recession, the discrepancy between the true market
value and the book value of assets is probably growing."16 Finally, unlike
the late 1980s when most of the failed banks were small, today's
problems are "heavily concentrated"' It in the large banks, and therefore
it is likely that more failures will occur in these larger banks than indi-
cated in the scenarios.18 Thus, the combined effect of these factors on
the models supports the conclusion that the true costs to BIF over the
next three years will likely be towards the higher end of the ranges.
Thus, the House-commissioned study concluded that even if the as-
sessments were to rise, "bank resolution costs.., would clearly exhaust
[BIF's] resources.""' 9 Because BIF "will be out of cash,"'20 the authors
104. See id. This scenario assumes a deterioration of the industry approximately one-
third less severe than was experienced in Texas. See id.
105. See id.
106. This scenario assumes that the recession will be half as severe as experienced in
New England. See id.
107. See id.
108. See id. at 12 (statement by Mr. Brumbaugh); id. at 16 (statement by Mr. Litan).
109. Id.
110. See id. at 17.
111. Id. at 12 (statement by Mr. Brumbaugh).
112. See id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 13.
115. Id. at 16 (statement by Mr. Litan).
116. See id.
117. Id.
118. See id. at 16-17.
119. Id. at 19 (statement by Mr. Barth). Compare supra note 110 and accompanying
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suggest that BIF is already insolvent. 121
While the eulogies for BIF may be premature, the present state of the
commercial banking industry serves only to amplify concerns that BIF
will be depleted and require taxpayer assistance, rather than to assuage
those concerns. 122 The news from individual large banks, for example,
has been grim. 123 Although the failure of just one large bank could pose
text (BIF expected to incur $31 to $43 billion in expenses) with supra note 100 and ac-
companying text (BIF would have $31 billion in available resources).
120. Bank Insurance Fund Hearings, supra note 98, at 34 (statement by Mr. Litan).
121. See id. at 11 (statement by Mr. Brumbaugh).
122. Nothing brings the state of the banking industry "closer to home" than trying to
find a cash machine in the formerly "branch-rich" Pennsylvania Station in New York
City. Of the three banks that had branches in the Long Island Railroad pavilion, no
branches remained open in October 1990.
123. For example, in October 1990, one of the nation's large banking companies, the
Bank of New England, announced losses of $123.2 million in the third quarter of 1990.
See Quint, Bad Loans Up in New England Bank Loss, N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1990, at 29,
col. 3. These losses raised the company's total losses over the last year to $1.44 billion
and lowered its shareholder capital to about 1. 1% of its assets. See id.
In December 1990, reports began to circulate that the Treasury was helping the Bank
of New England by placing more than one billion dollars in the bank. See Gerth, Treas-
ury Helping New England Bank With Big Deposits: Over $1 Billion in Cash, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 13, 1990, at Al, col. 2. But see Bacon, U.S. Denies Report It's Propping Up Big
Boston Bank, Wall St. J., Dec. 13, 1990, at A9, col. 3. In early January, the bank an-
nounced that it expected a large fourth quarter loss and would have no funds to absorb
future loan losses. See Quint, Bank of New England Sees Loss, Pushing it to the Brink of
Failure, N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1991, at 1, col. 4. The losses totalled $450 million, resulting
in total losses of $653 million for the year. See Bacon & Suskind, U.S. Recession Claims
Bank of New England as First Big Victim, Wall St. J., Jan. 7, 1991, at A6, col. 4. The
bank's nonperforming assets totalled over three billion dollars. See id. On January 6,
1991, to stem a run of over one billion dollars in withdrawals, see Labaton, U.S. is Taking
Over a Group of Banks to Head off a Run, N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1991, at Al, col. 6, the
FDIC announced the seizure of the bank and stated that all deposits, including those over
$100,000, would be covered. See F.D.LC. Statement on Bank of New England, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 7, 1991, at D8, cols. 5-6; see also Ravo, No Lines Before 9 A.M. Outside
Hartford Bank, N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1991, at D8, col. 5 (run apparently halted with FDIC
seizure).
Meanwhile, Chase Manhattan Bank, one of the New York money-center banks, was
forced to cut five thousand jobs, trim its dividend by more than 50% and add one billion
dollars to its reserves to cover its mounting loan losses. See Bleakley, Chase Manhattan
Cuts Dividend, Staff, Presaging More Bad News in Banking, Wall St. J., Sept. 24, 1990, at
A3, cols. 2-3; Feder, Chase Manhattan to Cut 5,00OJobs and Trim Dividend, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 22, 1990, at 1, col. 4; see also Hilder, Chase May Take Big Charge-offs of Its Loans,
Wall St. J., Nov. 19, 1990, at C9, cols. 1-2 (indicating that Chase continues to experience
problems with its loan portfolio); Quint, Chase Says Its Losses Will Rise, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 17, 1990, at 31, col. 3 (same).
In the fourth quarter of 1990, Chase's earnings increased by 10%. See Hilder & Pul-
liam, Loan Weakness Hinders Profit at 3 Big Banks, Wall St. J., Jan. 15, 1991, at A4, col.
1. This gain was boosted by a six billion dollar asset sale, however. See id. Furthermore,
Chase's non-performing loans, excluding loans to less developed countries and foreclosed
real estate, increased 18.3% in the quarter, and Chase charged off $230 million against its
domestic loans, nearly double that of the year earlier. See id.
Citicorp, the nation's largest banking company, announced a 38% decline in earnings
and set aside $283 million for possible losses on its commercial loans, up from only $59
million a year ago. See Citicorp, Big Banks Post Modest Profits; Wells Fargo and Banc
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a serious threat to BIF's solvency,124 the woes of the banking industry
are not limited to a few banks.'25 There are over one thousand banks on
the government's problem bank list, representing about twelve percent of
the industry.'26 Other indicators similarly demonstrate the industry's
One Stand Out, Wall St. J., Oct. 17, 1990, at A2, cols. 3-4; Quint, Citicorp Earnings Drop
38%, N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1990, at D1, col. 6.
Furthermore, in October 1990, a Citicorp auction of 49-day securities nearly failed.
See Bleakley, Citicorp Forced To Boost Rate On Share Issue, Wall St. J., Oct. 23, 1990, at
A4, col. 3; Gilpin, Citicorp's Debt Auction Nearly Fails, N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1990, at Dl,
col. 6. Under Citicorp's variable-rate preferred issues, there must be sufficient bids at
auction to yield at or below 120% of the rate of double-A commercial paper to match the
offers to sell, otherwise, the auction is considered failed and all the existing holders are
paid the maximum rate. See Bleakley, Citicorp Forced To Boost Rate On Share Issue,
Wall St. J., Oct. 23, 1990, at A4, col. 3; Gilpin, Citicorp's Debt Auction Nearly Fails, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 23, 1990, at D1, col. 6. To prevent a recurrence of a near failure, Citicorp
changed its rules to permit payments of up to 16.25% interest on its preferred stock. See
Bleakley, Citicorp Again Raises Issue's Rate, Wall St. J., Oct. 25, 1990, at Cl, col. 2;
Norris, A Costly Citicorp Move to Win Over Investors, N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1990, at D1,
cols. 4-5. To this end, in its October 24, 1990 auction, Citicorp paid 12.5% interest,
which is two times the double-A commercial paper rate. See Bleakley, Citicorp Again
Raises Issue's Rate, Wall St. J., Oct. 25, 1990, at Cl, col. I; Norris, A Costly Citicorp
Move to Win Over Investors, N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1990, at Dl, cols. 4-5. The following
week, the rate continued to rise, reaching 13%. See Bleakley, Citicorp's Rate on Preferred
Stock Increases Again, Wall St. J., Nov. 1, 1990, at C18, col. 3. Rather than continue
paying high rates, Citicorp decided to redeem some shares. See Bleakley, Citicorp to
Redeem Preferred Shares Amid Talk it Seeks $1 Billion in Capital, Wall St. J., Nov. 8,
1990, at A3, col. 2; Quint, Citicorp to Redeem Some Stock, N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1990, at
Dl, col. 6. In addition, Citicorp has sought foreign capital. See Hylton, Citicorp to Offer
Shares Abroad, N.Y. Times, Nov. 12, 1990, at D5, cols. 4-6; Bleakley, Citicorp to Redeem
Preferred Shares Amid Talk it Seeks $1 Billion in Capital, Wall St. J., Nov. 8, 1990, at
A3, col. 2.
As a result of anticipated continued problems with Citicorp's real estate and leveraged
loan portfolio, Standard and Poor's Company downgraded the bank's debt one notch.
See Bleakley, S&P Lowers Debt for Citicorp, Wall St. J., Nov. 6, 1990, at A8, col. 1.
Citicorp subsequently posted "a fourth quarter loss of $300 million to $400 million stem-
ming largely from increased commercial loan loss reserves." Hilder, Citicorp to Post 4th-
Quarter Loss of Over $300 Million, Cut Payout, Wall St. J., Dec. 19, 1990, at A3, col. 1-3;
see Quint, Biggest U.S. Bank Retrenches Again, N.Y. Times, Dec. 19, 1990, at Al, col. 5.
During this period, Citicorp increased its loan-loss reserves by $979 million, see Hilder,
Loan Provisions Spur Losses at Citicorp, 2 Other Banks, Wall St. J., Jan. 16, 199 1, at A2,
col. 1-2, including a 31% increase in its consumer loan-loss provisions. See id. at A2, col.
2.
124. The $11.4 billion in BIF would not be enough to cover the deposits of a failed
bank one sixth the size of Chase Manhattan. See Byron, The Bad-News Banks, N.Y.
Mag., Oct. 8, 1990, at 16.
125. In December 1990, a management consultant from McKinsey & Company con-
tended that 1.5% of the banks are so weak that the FDIC should close them. See Quint,
Experts Suggest Cures for an Ailing Bank System, N.Y. Times, Jan. 1, 1991, at 42, col. 3.
He further calculated that nine percent of the industry, holding $300 billion in assets,
would need assistance to prevent its failure during a recession and that the next twelve
percent of the industry, with $400 billion in assets, has been severely weakened by bad
loans. See id. at 42, cols. 3-4.
126. The FDIC mid-year report indicated that there were 1,034 problem banks, or




Industry Condition Hearings, supra note 94, at 8 (statement by Mr. Bowsher) (indicating
concern regarding the number of problem banks).
Additionally, some troubled banks are not included on the problem list. For example,
the Bank of New England, see supra note 123, received assistance without ever appearing
on the problem bank list. See Industry Condition Hearings, supra note 94, at 25 (state-
ment by Mr. Bowsher).
Authorities apparently take comfort in the fact that the industry is not facing the wide-
spread failures that were seen during the S&L crisis. See, e.g., Felsenfeld, The Savings
and Loan Crisis-Yet Another Analysis, in Annual Survey of Financial Institutions and
Regulation, The S&L Crisis: Death and Transfiguration, 59 Fordham L. Rev. S7, S40
(1991) (commercial banks, in contrast to savings associations, are healthy); Labaton,
Banking's Limited Crisis, N.Y. Times, Dec. 27, 1990, at Al, col. 1 (authorities reject
crisis in commercial banks because fewer banks in jeopardy); Quint, Four Formulas for
Avoiding the Mess in Banking, N.Y. Times, Dec. 23, 1990, § 3, at 4, col. 1 ("[b]ut only"
about 1,000 of the commercial banks are in enough trouble to be labeled by regulators as
"problems"). The problem, however, may be that although there is not the widespread
collapse of an industry as was seen in the S&L crisis, both the size of the average failed
banking institution and the cost of resolution may be greater. See supra note 74; see also
Bank Insurance Fund Hearings, supra note 98, at 3 (statement by Rep. Annunzio)
("While the causes of the bank and savings and loan insurance fund troubles may be
different, the results could be exactly the same. Namely, a taxpayer bail out.. ."); id. at 4
(statement by Rep. Wylie) ("there is sufficient evidence that [BIF] is in the same position
as FSLIC was in [the] mid-1980s"); Schmitt, Brumbaugh Returns to Bedevil Bank Regu-
lators with New Study, Wall St. J., Dec. 17, 1990, at B6, cols. 2-3 (research director for
the U.S. League of Savings Institutions sees "eerie similarities" between the S&Ls and
banks).
127. In the second quarter of 1990, banks earned a total of $5.3 billion, $1.7 billion less
than in the second quarter of 1989, and provisions for loan losses were two billion dollars
above 1989's second quarter totals, reaching $6.4 billion. See Sandy, 'Quarterly Banking
Profile' Released by FDIC, [Bulletin 6] Control of Banking (P-H) 1 6.4, at 9 (Sept. 14,
1990). Additionally, the commercial bank industry's return on assets was 0.64% in the
second quarter, compared with the 0.88% return in the second quarter of 1989. See Id.
It also appears that the real estate problems that plagued the banks in the Northeast
have spread to the mid-Atlantic states. See id. Overall, the industry's total non-current
real estate loans increased by $3.2 billion over last year, representing a 13% increase. See
id. at 10. Furthermore, there are indications that the real estate market will continue to
worsen. See Hylton, Real Estate Woes Seen Worsening, N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1990, at
Dl, col. 6. This downturn has and will continue to hurt bank loan portfolios. See
Pacelle, Citicorp Says Delinquent Home Loans Rose to $1.1 Billion in Third Quarter, Wall
St. J., Nov. 21, 1990, at A6, cols. 1-3; Quint, Mortgage Woes Rise At Citicorp, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 21, 1990, at D1, col. 6; Hylton, Real Estate Woes Seen Worsening, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 19, 1990, at DI, col. 6; see also Quint, A Crystal Ball for Banking's Ills, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 12, 1991, at 33, col. 4 (" 'The commercial real estate market is in a free fall,
and in the past few weeks it appears that the rate of decline has actually accelerated....
'It does not bode well for the banks ....' ") (quoting Thomas Hanely, banking analyst at
Salomon Brothers). These predictions were borne out in the third quarter of 1990.
During the third quarter of 1990, banks reported that they had earned $3.75 billion,
down 29% from the second quarter. See Bacon, Bank Insurance Fund '90 Losses Put at
$4 Billion, Wall St. J., Dec. 12, 1990, at A2, col. 2; Labaton, $4 Billion Loss Seen by
F.D.I.C., N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1990, at DI, col. 3. The outlook for the fourth quarter
remains bleak, with real estate loans remaining the main problem. See Bacon, Bank In-
surance Fund '90 Losses Put at $4 Billion, Wall St. J., Dec. 12, 1990, at A2, col. 2;
Labaton, $4 Billion Loss Seen by F.D.L C., N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1990, at D1, col. 3.
In addition to the real estate problems, the bank industry's consumer lending portfolios
are also weakening. See Lowenstein, Consumers May Not Cure Banks' Woes, Wall St. J.,
Dec. 21, 1990, at Cl, col. 3. Not only is the growth of these profit-rich loans slowing, see
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For example, the banking industry's loan portfolios are worse now
than when the country was coming out of its last major recession. 128 The
FDIC reported that the industry's non-performing loans grew to over
sixty billion dollars by mid-1990. 29 By September 1990, non-current
bank loans had reached $89.6 billion, which represents 2.65% of total
bank assets.13 ° This level of non-current loans is the highest since 1982,
when such data was first reported.' Further, a bank analyst for Salo-
mon Brothers estimated that "problem loans" ' at the end of 1989 rep-
resented 2.6% of total loans and would rise to 3.5% by the end of
1990.133 Although a non-performing loan will not necessarily prove to
be a bad loan, the dramatic rise in the value of non-performing assets
does present questions about the industry's well-being and the potential
costs to BIF.
These sobering statistics concerning the health of the banking indus-
try, combined with the gloomy estimates of the fund's current solvency,
have spurred Congress to consider numerous proposals for deposit-insur-
ance reform in order to prevent further BIF decreases and a potential
taxpayer bailout.
II. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
Various authorities have proposed over a dozen reforms to ease the
financial stress on the banking industry and BIF.'" The proposals range
id. at Cl, cols. 3-4, but the charge-offs for consumer loans have also been increasing. See
id. at C2, cols. 3-4; see also Pacelle & Castro, Banks Scrutinize Some Consumer Debt,
Wall St. J., Dec. 14, 1990, at A2, cols. 2-4 (rising delinquencies on consumer loans caus-
ing banks to be more cautious).
128. See Norris, Can Banks Survive a Recession?, N.Y. Tunes, Sept. 26, 1990, at DI,
col. 4; see also Seidman I, supra note 53, app. I at fig. 2 (graph of net charge-offs of total
loans of insured commercial banks, 1961 through 1989, inclusive); Lohr, Banking's Real
Estate Miseries, N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1991, § 3, at 1, col. 2 ("'Our banks are going into
this recession weaker than they have been since the 1930's.'") (quoting James Barth,
finance professor).
129. See Byron, The Bad-News Banks, N.Y. Mag., Oct. 8, 1990, at 16 (chart).
130. See Bacon, Bank Insurance Fund '90 Losses Put at $4 Billion, Wall St. J., Dec. 12,
1990, at A10, col. 1.
131. See id.
Additionally, banks appear less able to deal with increasing loan losses as their reserves
have fallen to 73 cents, a 10 cent decrease from a year ago, for each dollar of non-current
loans. See id.
132. "Problem loans include those listed as nonperforming, which normally means
payments are overdue or likely to become so, and loans renegotiated to provide breaks for
the borrower, as well as real estate loans on foreclosed property." Norris, Can Banks
Survive a Recession?, N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1990, at Dl, col. 4.
In an attempt to soften the appearance of these problems, some banks have been re-
classifying renegotiated loans as performing, see Suskind, Some Banks Use Accounting
Techniques That Conceal Loan Woes, Regulators Say, Wall St. J., Nov. 29, 1990, at A4,
cols. 2-3, although such loans may still cause a drain on earnings. See id. at A4, col. 3.
133. See Norris, Can Banks Survive a Recession?, N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1990, at DI,
col. 4.
134. See infra notes 138-389 and accompanying text; see, eg., Labaton, Congress Takes
First Step to Buoy Deposit Insurance, N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1991, at Dl, col. 1 (legislators
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from minor modifications to major structural changes in both the indus-
try and the federal deposit-insurance system and include drastically re-
ducing the insurance coverage and overhauling the entire banking
industry.13 Each option has advantages and disadvantages and none
introduced "flurry" of legislation to overhaul BIF and banking industry); Anders, Here's
How Banks Just Might Recover.... Wall St. J., Nov. 12, 1990, at B7C, cols. 1-3 (various
opinions on reforming banking system); Wayne, Key Man at Banking's Crossroads, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 8, 1990, at D9, cols. 3-6 (administration considering proposals for bank
reform); Chernow, The Menace of the Small Bank, Wall St. J., Oct. 31, 1990, at A14,
cols. 3-6 (urging reform of bank system); Atkinson, Pressure Mounts for International
Deposit Insurance Coverage, Am. Banker, Sept. 27, 1990, at 2 (reporting budget office
citing 20 proposals for reform).




H.R. 6 separate chartering and regulatory
functions, unify regulatory functions
under a single agency, limit discre-
tion of regulators, eliminate "too-
big-to-fail," and authorize risk-based
premiums
H.R. 15 recapitalize BIF, restructure regula-
tory system and reform the industry
H.R. 31 recapitalize BIF
H.R. 679 limit insurance to $100,000 per-
person for any 36-month period
S. 261 permit risk-based premiums, require
annual examinations of every bank,
and eliminate "too-big-to-fail"
S. 263 modernize and reform financial
services and strengthen enforcement
authority of regulators
S. 274 modify procedures for approving
deposit insurance and require imple-
mentation of risk-based premiums
S. 280 include foreign deposits in assess-
ment base, require risk-based premi-
ums and curtail regulatory
discretion
Citation
See 137 Cong. Rec. H43-45 (daily
ed. Jan. 3, 1991) (statement by Rep.
Gonzalez).
See 137 Cong. Rec. H54 (daily ed.
Jan. 3, 1991) (statement by Rep.
Wylie).
See 137 Cong. Rec. H758 (daily ed.
Jan. 29, 1991) (statement by Rep.
Annunzio).
See 137 Cong. Rec. H780 (daily ed.
Jan. 29, 1991) (statement by Rep.
Conte).
See 137 Cong. Rec. Sl 159, S1160
(daily ed. Jan. 24, 1991) (statement
by Sen. Dixon).
See 137 Cong. Rec. S1160, S1161
(daily ed. Jan. 24, 1991) (statement
by Sen. Dixon).
See 137 Cong. Rec. S1220 (daily ed.
Jan. 29, 1991) (statement by Sen.
Graham).
See 137 Cong. Rec. S1235 (daily ed.
Jan. 29, 1991) (statement by Sen.
Dole).
On March 20, 1991, the Treasury Department introduced its "sweeping proposal to
overhaul the banking system." Labaton, Congress Gets Bush Bank Plan, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 21, 1991, at D6, col. 6. The bill is 317 pages long, see id., and proposes "to reform
the Federal deposit insurance system, to improve the supervision and regulation to feder-
ally insured depository institutions, to reform the financial services industry as to the
activities in which that industry may engage, to consolidate the regulatory structure for
depository institutions, to recapitalize [BIF], and for other purposes." 137 Cong. Rec.
H1912 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 1991) (statement by Rep. Gonzalez).
135. As an indication that any valid proposal was open for discussion, Representative
Gonzalez, chairman of the House Banking Committee, declared, while announcing the
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solves all of the problems. For this reason, some of the options have been
introduced in varying combinations as well as by themselves. 36
To facilitate analysis of these options, the proposals have been grouped
into three categories based upon the particular goal of the reform.' 37 The
proposals attempt either to replenish BIF, to reduce the potential liability
of BIF or to initiate structural reform of either the deposit-insurance sys-
tem or the banking industry. All the proposals have the ultimate goal of
preventing the need for a taxpayer bailout of BIF and the banking
industry.
A. Replenishing the Insurance Fund
The aim of the reforms within this category is to provide BIF with
sufficient funds to deal with whatever bank failures occur.
1. Increased Premium Flexibility
The first proposal focuses on increasing the FDIC's discretion in deter-
mining BIF assessments. All variants of this proposal are based on lift-
ing the ceilings on the assessment premiums that the FDIC charges
insured banks. 3 For instance, during the last Congressional session,
both the House of Representatives 39 and the Senate""' considered legis-
lation to give the FDIC greater discretion to raise premiums and to per-
mit the FDIC to set assessments twice a year' 4' rather than annually.142
The passage of premium reform would not necessarily mean that pre-
miums would be raised. 4 3 In fact, FDIC Chairman Seidman has indi-
opening of hearings on the deposit-insurance system, that "Congress should not regard
the $100,000-per-account insurance as a divine right." Panel to Consider Deposit Insur-
ance Overhaul, L.A. Times, Feb. 15, 1990, at D2, col. 3. A reform of the scope of deposit
insurance was previously considered "too hot to handle." Id.
136. For example, see bills cited supra note 134.
137. This will cause artificial problems because, for the most part, suggestions for re-
form include several of the proposals working together. An analysis of every possible
combination, however, would be impossible given the scope of this Note.
The regulators have urged Congress to restructure the industry and the deposit insur-
ance system simultaneously, arguing that the two are "inextricably linked." Congress,
however, points only to the urgent need for deposit-insurance reform, apparently believ-
ing that industry reform is not as pressing. FDIC Endorses Administration Proposal to
Let Agency Hike Insurance Premiums, 55 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 13, at 521 (Oct. 1,
1990).
138. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 208, 103 Stat. at 206-09 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1817).
139. See H.R. 5610, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 Cong. Rec. 7653, 7658 (1990).
140. See S. 3045, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 Cong. Rec. 13099 (1990); see also FDIC
Endorses Administration Proposal to Let Agency Hike Insurance Premiums, 55 Banking
Rep. (BNA) No. 13, at 520 (Oct. 1, 1990) (noting that S. 3045 is similar to the House
legislation).
141. See H.R. 5610 § 2, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 Cong. Rec. 7653, 7653 (1990).
142. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 208(4)(1)(A)Ci), 103 Stat. at 207 (to be codified at
12 U.S.C. § 1817(b)(1)(A)(i)).




cated that he does not believe that premiums will need to be raised for
the time being. 1" Nonetheless, the enactment of such legislation would
provide the FDIC with immediate flexibility to increase premiums, pre-
sumably increasing BIF's revenue, replenishing BIF and covering the ex-
penses of more failures before needing to tax the public. 145 In addition,
the proposal's proponents argue that premium ceilings should be lifted
because "[tlhe existence of the premium ceiling creates false expectations
that deposit insurance will be cheap, regardless of the underlying
risks."146
There is strong concern, however, that pressures to increase BIF's net
worth, combined with the proposals' added flexibility, would lead to a
large premium increase, thereby potentially causing even more bank fail-
ures. Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, for example, has
warned that the FDIC "can create problems for the American taxpayer
by having premiums that are.., too high .... If we set the premiums
too high, we can induce more bankruptcies. The banks would then fall
back on the F.D.I.C. and the taxpayers would be worse off., 1 47 Simi-
larly, a study released by the CBO concluded that while premiums would
have to rise to forty-three cents1 48 to get BIF to the level considered
"safe" by Congress, 49 a premium this high could cause forty large banks
to fail. 150
A White House proposal goes further than the aforementioned Con-
gressional plan and includes two additional key provisions.151 First, the
plan would amend the laws requiring the FDIC to rebate a portion of a
144. See Labaton, Lawmakers Rushing to Lift Caps on F.D.I.C Premiums, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 13, 1990, at D8, col. 4.
Roger Watson, an FDIC official, indicated that although the FDIC has no increase
currently planned, if the pace of bank failures escalates, the FDIC would consider raising
the premium for one year to as high as 50 cents. See Bleakley, FDIC May Assess One-
Time Premium If the Pace of Bank Failures Increases, Wall St. J., Nov. 5, 1990, at A2,
cols. 3-4.
145. See Reischauer House Testimony, supra note 90, at 12.
146. 136 Cong. Rec. H7182 (daily ed. Sept. 5, 1990) (statement of Rep. Gonzalez); see
also Bank Insurance In S.E.C. Study, N.Y. Times, Mar. 30, 1991, at 26, col. 4 (SEC study
concluded that the value of bank deposit insurance is worth three to five times current
premiums).
147. Labaton, Greenspan Urges Cautious Moves to Shore Up the Banking System, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 14, 1990, at D2, cols. 5-6 (quoting Greenspan).
148. See Labaton, Treasury Urges Restrictions on Bank Deposit Insurance, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 27, 1990, at D2, col. 1.
149. This assumes that Congress considers the "target" level of the FIRREA legisla-
tion as the "safe" level of the fund. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 208(4)(1)(B)(i), 103
Stat. at 207 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b)(1)(B)(i)).
150. See Labaton, Treasury Urges Restrictions on Bank Deposit Insurance, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 27, 1990, at D2, cols. 1-2.
151. Compare supra notes 139-142 and accompanying text (discussing House version
of the proposal) with infra notes 152-155 and accompanying text (discussing key addi-
tions in the White House plan). See also FDIC Endorses Administration Proposal To Let




bank's assessment,1 52 leaving rebate determinations to the FDIC's discre-
tion. This proposal would permit the FDIC to consider the need to build
up BIF's reserves to "withstand future periods of unusual stress." '53 Ad-
ditionally, the Administration proposal would authorize the FDIC to ob-
tain loans from the Federal Financing Bank ("FFB")lM in order to
provide cheaper, short-term working capital for the fund.I55 This provi-
sion would give the FDIC the flexibility not to raise premiums in a par-
ticular year as long as the fund's long-term prospects were positive.
The Administration proposal provides increased protection for BIF.
Chairman Seidman expressed his approval for the provision removing
mandatory rebates and noted that BIF would have thirty billion dollars
in reserves and "would clearly not be under stress today" if rebates had
not previously been required.'56 Also, the provision permitting BIF to be
replenished by FFB loans is advantageous because it permits the fund to
experience short-term losses without increasing fees and needlessly sad-
dling an industry experiencing temporary difficulties with additional
problems.
Despite the merits of the above proposals, FDIC Chairman Seidman
stressed that flexibility to increase premiums is not the sole answer to all
of the insurance fund's problems because the higher assessments that
such flexibility allows would further weaken the banking industry. 5 ' Be-
cause banks pass higher premiums on to their customers through higher
fees for services,158 higher premiums may threaten the industry's ability
to compete against nondepository institutions, such as money markets
and mutual funds, and further strain the viability of the industry.' 59 Ad-
ditionally, if BIF is truly in crisis, simply increasing rate-setting discre-
tion may raise future revenue, but will not provide the necessary
152. Current law requires that rebates be issued if the insurance fund maintains certain
ratio levels. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 208(5)(d)(2)(A)-(B), 103 Stat. at 210-11 (to be
codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1817(d)(2)(A)-(B)).
153. FDIC Endorses Administration Proposal to Let Agency Hike Insurance Premiums,
55 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 13, at 520 (Oct. 1, 1990).
This action would also increase BIFs interest income because the fund's balances
would be larger. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
154. The FFB purchases and sells obligations on behalf of federal agencies. See 12
U.S.C. § 2285 (1988).
The Administration's banking reform bill, see supra note 134, calls for an increase in
the FDIC's borrowing authority to seventy billion dollars. See Labaton, US. Seeks
Much Bigger Amount to Shore Up Bank Deposit Fund: Plans to Authorize Borrowing Up to
$70 Billion, N.Y. Times, Mar. 22, 1991, at Al, cols. 1, 2.
155. See FDIC Endorses Administration Proposal to Let Agency Hike Insurance Premi-
ums, 55 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 13, at 520 (Oct. 1, 1990).
156. Id.
157. See Hearings on Deposit Insurance Reform Before the House Banking Comm.,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (Sept. 25, 1990) [hereinafter Reform Hearings] (statement of Mr.
Seidman) (LEXIS, Nexis library, Fednews file).
158. See Reischauer House Testimony, supra note 90, at 10.
159. See id. at 12.
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immediate cash infusion.16° Finally, no matter how much insurance pre-
miums increase, the nature of insurance makes it inevitable that BIF can-
not be healthy unless the insured industry is healthy. Therefore, while
granting premium discretion to the FDIC may be part of the answer, it is
only one step towards appropriate reform.
2. Recapitalization
Responding to concerns that BIF "is teetering on the brink of insol-
vency.... [and] too thinly capitalized to deal with potential bank fail-
ures," '16 1 Representative Annunzio has suggested that every FDIC-
insured bank be required to pay an amount equal to one percent of its
deposits into the fund. 62 The plan would immediately raise twenty-five
billion dollars for BIF.16 Representative Annunzio hopes that this
would prevent the taxpayers from having to bail out BIF. He predicts
that under the plan, BIF's reserve ratio immediately would rise to
160. The Administration proposal, however, handles this problem by permitting the
FDIC to get FFB financing. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
161. See 136 Cong. Rec. H7655-56 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1990) (statement of Rep.
Annunzio).
162. See id.; see also H.R. 5590, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 Cong. Rec. 7502 (1990)
(introduction of bill).
The Bush administration initially considered a similar plan that would require banks to
purchase preferred stock from the FDIC. See Bacon, Administration Weighs Plan on
FDIC Stock, Wall St. J., Nov. 28, 1990, at A3, col. 1. The plan involved requiring the
banks to purchase FDIC stock in an amount equivalent to one-half to one percent of their
total deposits. See id. Although using a different mechanism, the Annunzio and Admin-
istration plans are functionally equivalent and the following analysis applies to both.
A recapitalization plan was also under consideration by the Treasury as part of its
banking package and included levying a one-time special assessment on the industry of
$25 billion. See Bacon, Treasury Mulls Charging Banks Additional Fee, Wall St. J., Jan.
3, 1991, at C8, col. 6. Apparently, the final Treasury proposal was not expected to ad-
dress how to recapitalize the deposit-insurance funds. See Bacon, Big Banks Would Get
Vastly Broader Powers Under Treasury's Plan, Wall St. J., Feb. 6, 1991, at A6, col. 1;
Labaton, Administration Presents its Plan for Broad Overhaul of Banking, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 6, 1991, at D6, col. 4. Instead, the Treasury expected the FDIC and bankers to
formulate their own plan. See id.; see also Labaton, Bankers Offer Their Plan to Bolster
Insurance Fund, N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1991, at Dl, col. 1 (bankers offer proposal to
borrow money from industry through sale of bonds). The final version of the Treasury's
bill, however, does include a provision to recapitalize BIF by granting the FDIC the
authority to borrow up to twenty-five billion dollars from the FFB. See Thomas, New
Banking Rules to Provide Means to Bolster FDIC, Wall St. J., Mar. 19, 1991, at A26, col.
1; see also Labaton, U.S. Seeks Much Bigger Amount to Shore Up Bank Deposit Fund,
N.Y. Times, Mar. 22, 1991, at Al, col. 1 (FDIC Chairman Seidman states that the Ad-
ministration's plan actually permits the FDIC to borrow $70 billion). This borrowing
proposal is very similar to a plan that was originally proposed as part of an Administra-
tion plan increasing premium flexibility. See supra notes 154-155 and accompanying text.
163. See 136 Cong. Rec. H7656 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1990) (statement of Rep. Annun-
zio).
The Administration's stock purchase plan, see supra note 162, had it been imple-
mented, was expected to produce $14 to $28 billion. See Bacon, Administration Weighs
Plan on FDIC Stock, Wall St. J., Nov. 28, 1990, at A3, col. 1.
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1.70%."4 Such a cash inflow would clearly improve the fund's financial
condition without the need to resort to the taxpayers.
Of major concern to the regulators, however, is how the recapitaliza-
tion payment would be treated from an accounting standpoint. 6 If the
payments to BIF were carried as an asset,I" the banks would in effect be
making an equity investment in the FDIC. 67 Thus, if the fund lost
money, the value of bank assets would be reduced accordingly. This re-
sult might discourage risky activities because deposit insurance losses
would be reflected directly on the banking industry's books. 6
This approach, however, is nothing more than a clever system of per-
mitting the banks to count the same money twice: once on their own
books and again in computing BIF's balance. 6 9 Treating the payment as
an asset might also have negative implications as to the FDIC's ability to
control BIF.1 7 The Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
("FSLIC") accrued a secondary reserve consisting of premium prepay-
ments between 1961 and 1973.17 The secondary reserve was treated as
an asset on the industry's books.' 72 Even after FSLIC recognized the
increasing costs it was facing and accordingly ordered a write-off of the
reserve fund,73 Congress nevertheless ordered the recapitalized fund to
issue rebates to the thrifts, shifting the costs of the industry's collapse
from the industry to the taxpayers. 74 Thus, the possibility exists that
long after the present crisis has passed, a banking industry facing increas-
ing financial difficulties could successfully lobby Congress to order the
164. See Panel Warned to Wait on Annunzio BIF Bill, But Seidman Says it Has Some
Merit, 55 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 13, at 526 (Oct. 1, 1990).
165. Chairman Seidman stated, "One of the important issues raised by [the proposal]
is the accounting treatment [of the assessment]." Statement of L. William Seidman,
Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, on H.R. 5590, Bank Account Safety
and Soundness Act Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regula-
tion and Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs 3 (Sept.
27, 1990) (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation press release) [hereinafter Seidman II];
see also Panel Warned to Wait on Annunzio BIF Bill But Seidman Says it Has Some
Merit, 55 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 13, at 526 (Oct. 1, 1990) (discussing concern of
regulators about the accounting standard).
Under the Administration's proposed stock purchase plan, see supra note 162, it was
never resolved whether the stock would have been treated as part of the banks' capital.
See Bacon, Administration Weighs Plan on FDIC Stock, Wall St. J., Nov. 28, 1990, at
A10, col. 3.
166. Thus, the payment would also be considered part of a bank's capital.
167. See Seidman II, supra note 165, at 3.
168. See id.
169. Lawrence White suggests that this would permit the banks to "have their cake
and eat it too." White, How Not to Save the FDIC, Wall St. J., Jan. 8, 1991, at A14, col.
4. He argues that the plan is "outright double-counting," id., and merely a "smoke-and-
mirrors approach" for dealing with a serious financial problem. Id. at A14, col. 5.
170. See Seidman II, supra note 165, at 3-4.
171. See House Panel Probes Depletion, Possible Restoration of FSLIC Secondary Re-
serve, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) No. 114, at A-1 (June 16, 1987).
172. See id.
173. See id.
174. See Seidman II, supra note 165, at 3-4.
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FDIC to return "the banks' money,"' 7 claiming that the funds are
needed to prevent the failure of individual organizations. Chairman
Seidman warned that if asset accounting was adopted, the possibility of
this scenario would lead to increased uncertainty about the availability of
the insurance fund's resources in critical times." 6
On the other hand, if the BIF recapitalization was treated as an ex-
pense, like current premium payments, the deposits in BIF would have
the advantage of not being attachable by bank creditors in the event of a
bankruptcy. 7 ' This approach, however, would cause an immediate de-
crease in bank capital. The FDIC fears that banks "subject to a large
one-time loss... may have difficulty restoring capital levels."'178
Apart from the accounting dispute, it is unlikely that the weakened
banking industry could support Annunzio's recapitalization plan. The
assessment would be expected to produce twenty-five billion dollars,
nearly double the total bank earnings of 1989.179 This comparison
strongly suggests that the industry may not have the resources to handle
a one-year recapitalization. s0 Chairman Seidman indicated that Annun-
zio's plan "would drive 28 additional banks into insolvency, and [make
another] 241 banks ... capital-deficient." I1 Although he deems the bill
to have "'great merit,'" he said it should be enacted only as a "'drastic
step'" because it "'would throw the entire industry into a loss.' "182
175. This argument was exactly the one that the thrifts used. See House Panel Probes
Depletion, Possible Restoration of FSLIC Secondary Reserve, Daily Rep. for Executives
(BNA) No. 114, at A-2 (June 16, 1987). In 1987, an officer of the Association of Thrift
Holding Companies stated, 'The bank board has stolen our money." Id.
176. See Seidman II, supra note 165, at 3-4.
177. See Panel Warned to Wait on Annunzio BIF Bill, But Seidman Says it Has Some
Merit, 55 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 13, at 526-27 (Oct. 1, 1990).
178. Seidman II, supra note 165, at 4.
179. Bank earnings in 1989 were $15.7 billion. See id. at 5.
180. See id; see also White, How Not to Save the FDIC, Wall St. J., Jan. 8, 1991, at
A14, col. 5 (current credit crunch makes it a bad time to ask banks to contract their
assets).
Additionally, the industry earned only about 60 cents per $100 of deposits during the
first three quarters of 1990. See Labaton, Added Bank Fees Suggested to Aid Insurance
System, N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 1990, at Al, col. 3.
In an attempt to soften the impact of the proposal, the Treasury's recapitalization plan
includes the possibility for payments and write-offs to be stretched over a five-year period.
See Bacon, Treasury Mulls Charging Banks Additional Fee, Wall St. J., Jan. 3, 1991, at
C8, col. 6.
181. Seidman II, supra note 165, at 4-5.
182. Panel Warned to Wait on Annunzio BIF Bill, But Seidman Says it Has Some
Merit, 55 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 13, at 526 (Oct. 1, 1990) (quoting FDIC Chairman
Seidman).
Recently, Chairman Seidman has decided the time for drastic measures has arrived.
He acknowledged that BIF is " 'so weak that it needs to be recapitalized.'" Labaton, $5
Billion '91 Loss Seen for U.S. Fund Insuring Deposits, N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1990, at Al,
col. 6; see Labaton, Added Bank Fees Suggested to Aid Insurance System, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 18, 1990, at Al, col. 3. Furthermore, Chairman Seidman has decided that the as-




GAO Assistant Comptroller General Richard L. Fogel similarly voiced
doubts about how much money the industry could be asked to pay."'
While Comptroller of the Currency Robert Clarke opined that the plan
was a "constructive effort to maintain the strength of the deposit insur-
ance fund," he expressed apprehension about the plan, stating that it
should only be considered as a part of broad deposit-insurance re-
forms. 1' 4 In sum, placing a significant cost on the banking industry
when banks are under considerable stress could have unpredictable, even
disastrous, consequences.
B. Reducing BIF's Potential Liability
The objective of proposals in this category is to reduce the level of
BIF's potential liability by decreasing the level of insured deposits. Thus,
for any particular bank failure, the FDIC and the insurance fund would
have to pay out less money. Any such reform, however, must neither
destabilize the industry nor induce bank runs.
1. Eliminating "Too-big-to-fail"
"Too-big-to-fail," a concept identified and labelled during the 1984
rescue package arranged for Continental Illinois National Bank and
Trust Company,"8 5 refers to troubled banks that are allegedly too large
for the FDIC to close. When a bank fails, the FDIC may rescue the
bank by arranging for another institution to acquire the bank's liabilities,
both insured and uninsured, 8 6 or by providing direct financial assist-
ance. ' 7 Despite the express $100,000 limit on deposit insurance, 8 all
the bank's deposits are protected under the too-big-to-fail approach. It is
currently estimated that "better than 99 percent of all deposits are effec-
tively insured" by too-big-to-fail. 89 Thus, many proposals to lower
BIF's potential liability call for the elimination of too-big-to-fail.190
The FDIC claims, however, that it does not have a too-big-to-fail pol-
183. See Panel Warned to Wait on Annunzio BIF Bill, But Seidman Says it Has Some
Merit, 55 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 13, at 526, 527 (Oct. 1, 1990).
184. Id. at 526.
185. See 136 Cong. Rec. H7656 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1990) (statement of Rep. Annun-
zio).
Because of the assistance package, the FDIC never officially considered Continental
Illinois "failed." See id.
186. The account may be uninsured because of the nature of the account or because it
is greater than the $100,000 insurance limit.
187. See Seidman I, supra note 53, at 9.
188. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(1) (1988).
189. 136 Cong. Rec. H7183 (daily ed. Sept. 5, 1990) (statement of Rep. Annunzio); see
also Bacon, Treasury Plan to Favor Easing Bank Oversight, Wall St. J., Dec. 7, 1990, at
A4, col. 1 ("The FDIC has covered 99.5% of the deposits of banks that have failed since
1985.").
190. See Bacon, White House Plan Seeks to Reduce Scope of 'Too Big to Fail' Protection
for Banks, Wall St. J., Dec. 20, 1990, at A18, col. 5.
In most cases, the only depositors that are limited by the $100,000 ceiling are those in
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icy.191 Rather, Chairman Seidman explained that "the FDIC has a belief
that the possible failure of a large financial organization presents
macroeconomic issues of considerable significance, and that these
macroeconomic considerations cannot be legislated away." '9 2 Unfortu-
nately, this explanation appears to be a distinction without a differ-
ence. 193 In essence, while there may not be a de jure too-big-to-fail
policy, there is a de facto one. 194
Chairman Seidman justified his position that reform legislation should
not explicitly prohibit a too-big-to-fail approach on three grounds. First,
he contended that the government has a duty to consider the economy-
wide ramifications of a large bank failure.195 Second, he argued that ad-
hering to too-big-to-fail is actually cheaper than permitting an institution
to fail and paying off the depositors. 19 6 Therefore, a proposal to prevent
small banks that the Government liquidates rather than sells. See Duke, S&L Mess May
Spark A Thorough Overhaul of Deposit Insurance, Wall St. J., July 3, 1990, at A5, col. 1.
When the FDIC closed Freedom National Bank, a small community bank in Harlem,
New York, it initially covered only deposits up to the $100,000 insurance level. In clos-
ing the Bank of New England, however, the FDIC fully covered all depositors. This led
the New York State Attorney General to complain about the disparity of treatment be-
tween depositors at the two banks. See Abrams Faults F.D.L.C. Action, N.Y. Times, Jan.
8, 1991, at D8, col. 1. Subsequently, the FDIC announced it may consider makingfull
reimbursement to the uninsured depositors, suggesting that even depositors at small
banks would not face an insurance limit. See Castro, FDIC May Cover Freedom National
Deposits in Full, Wall St. J., Jan. 11, 1991, at A5C, col. 3.
One of the major points of contention concerning the Treasury Department's banking
proposal is that the plan does not eliminate too-big-to-fail. See Bacon, Banking Industry
Attacks Bush Plan to Reform Deposit Insurance System, Wall. St. J., Feb. 13, 1991, at A2,
col. 3; Bacon, Big Banks Would Get Vastly Broader Powers Under Treasury's Plan, Wall
St. J., Feb. 6, 1991, at A6, col. 2. The proposal, however, would place the "too-big-to-
fail" decision in the hands of the Treasury Department and Federal Reserve Board in-
stead of the FDIC. See Labaton, White House Proposes Curbs on Insured Deposits, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 3, 1991, § 1, at 28, col. 6.
191. See Seidman I, supra note 53, at 8.
192. Reform Hearings, supra note 157, at 8 (statement of Rep. Wylie quoting FDIC
Chairman Seidman).
193. Compare Testimony, L. William Seidman, Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, on Deposit Insurance Revision and Financial Services Restructuring Before
the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs 15 (Sept. 25, 1990) (Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation press release) [hereinafter Seidman III] ("the FDIC does
not in fact have a Too Big To Fail policy") with Seidman I, supra note 53, at 10 ("Too Big
To Fail as an issue would exist even in the absence of an explicit deposit insurance
program.").
194. Chairman Seidman indicated that "[p]ast experience in all major countries sup-
ports the contention that a Too Big To Fail policy exists, de facto if not de jure." Seid-
man I, supra note 53, at 11.
195. See id. at 10.
196. See Reform Hearings, supra note 157, at 8-9 (statement of Chairman Seidman).
Chairman Seidman explained that the FDIC
make[s] a calculation of what it will cost [the FDIC to] close the institution
down, fail it, pay off depositors, and... the alternative too-big-to-fail transac-
tion with someone buying out whatever parts of the institution they want.
And that calculation comes to a bottom line .... In almost all cases it's been
found cheaper to cover all depositors, and that's why we cover all depositors in
almost all bank failures.
S436 [Vol. 59
BANK INSURANCE FUND
the use of too-big-to-fail could actually cause a larger drain on BIF.'"
Finally, the absence of such a policy could cause massive withdrawals of
uninsured deposits, further straining the solvency of a troubled bank.198
By recognizing the reality that some banks are simply too big to fail,
this policy protects the economy from severe disturbances. Thus, too-
big-to-fail cannot be eliminated and any deposit insurance reform aimed
at reducing the coverage of federal deposit insurance must acknowledge
this reality.
2. Reducing the $100,000 Per Account Coverage
The "most prominent proposals"1 99 for reducing BIFs potential liabil-
ity suggest lowering the insurance ceiling below the current $100,000 per
account' or restricting coverage to the individual as opposed to the
account.2
01
Representative Gonzalez suggested that the $100,000 deposit insur-
ance ceiling 2 is not a "divine right""2 3 and that Congress should con-
sider reducing the coverage.' First, Representative Gonzalez suggested
that there was little justification for increasing the insurance ceiling from
$40,000 to $100,000:205 he recalled the proposal to increase the ceiling
being passed in less than fifteen minutes, with fewer than fifteen members
present and with no discussion, debate or hearings at any time.") Addi-
Id. at 9.
197. The Treasury Department backs the FDIC position, agreeing that regulators
should continue to have discretion in handling bank collapses that jeopardize the entire
financial system. See Labaton, Treasury Urges Restrictions on Bank Deposit Insurance,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1990, at D2, col. 3.
198. For example, prior to the FDIC's seizure of the Bank of New England and its
announcement that it was going to cover all deposits, see F.D..C Statement on Bank of
New England, N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1991, at D8, col. 6, over one billion dollars was with-
drawn in a two-day period. See Labaton, U.S. Is Taking Over a Group of Banks to Head
Off a Run, N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1991, at Al, col. 6.
199. Reischauer House Testimony, supra note 90, at 11.
200. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(1) (1988) (amended by FIRREA, supra note 1,
§§ 201(a)(1), 211, 103 Stat. at 187, 218-22).
201. It is questionable whether there is a limit at all, given "too-big-to-fail." See supra
notes 185-198 and accompanying text.
The Treasury Department has decided not to propose that Congress lower the
$100,000 insurance limit, but would probably propose limits on the number of accounts
that can be insured. See Labaton, Shifts in Deposit Insurance Weighed, N.Y. Tunes, Nov.
29, 1990, at D8, col. 6.
202. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(1) (1988) (amended by FIRREA, supra note 1,
§§ 201(a)(1), 211, 103 Stat. at 187, 218-22).
203. Panel To Consider Deposit Overhaul, L.A. Times, Feb. 15, 1990, at D2, col. 3.
204. See 136 Cong. Rec. H7183 (daily ed. Sept. 5, 1990) (statement of Rep. Gonzalez).
205. The insurance limit was raised by the Depository Institutions Deregulation and
Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 308(a)(1), 94 Stat. 132, 147.
206. See 136 Cong. Rec. H7183 (daily ed. Sept. 5, 1990) (statement of Rep. Gonzalez);
see also Note, Causes of the Savings and Loan Debacle, in Annual Survey of Financial
Institutions and Regulation, The S&L Crisis: Death and Transfiguration, 59 Fordham L
Rev. S301, S307-08 (1991) (discussing problems with deposit insurance).
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tionally, because the average account balance is only about $8,700o7 and
eighty to eighty-five percent of account holders have less than ten thou-
sand dollars in a bank,2 °0 the goal of deposit insurance to protect the
small depositor who does not have the means to investigate the sound-
ness of the institution would be maintained with a lower ceiling." 9 A
system of lower coverage would encourage banks to be more prudent
because large account investors would only deposit their funds at finan-
cially sound institutions.
Chairman Greenspan agreed that the $100,000 level of coverage may
not be justifiable, but maintains that "whatever the merits of the 1980
increase in the deposit insurance level.., the higher level of depositor
protection has been in place long enough to be... incorporated into the
financial decisions of millions of households [and] ... a wide variety of
bank... decisions."210 Therefore, lowering coverage would reduce the
banks' market values and involve large transaction costs. Thus, if Con-
gress lowers the limits, it must also provide "a meaningful transition
period." 21'
On the other hand, Mr. Greenspan testified that a decision to leave the
limit at $100,000 would not "preclude other reforms that would reduce
current inequities in, and abuses of" deposit insurance, such as limiting
insurance coverage to $100,000 per individual.2 12 As the system cur-
rently stands, it is possible for an individual to be insured in excess of the
$100,000 limit by keeping several different accounts213 or as the benefici-
ary of a large account.2"4 The major concern with proposals to limit
207. See 136 Cong. Rec. H7183 (daily ed. Sept. 5, 1990) (statement of Rep. Gonzalez).
208. See id.
209. Id.
210. Testimony by Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, Before the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs 4
(Sept. 13, 1990) (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System press release) [here-
inafter Greenspan Testimony].
211. Id. at 4-5.
212. Id. at 5-6.
213. See 136 Cong. Rec. H7183 (daily ed. Sept. 5, 1990) (statement of Rep. Gonzalez).
In the Freedom National Bank failure, however, the FDIC treated multiple accounts
of a single depositor as a single account. See Strom, Charities Face Large Losses in Failed
Bank, N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1990, at B1, col. 6. This was contrary to the expectations of
many depositors, see id., and apparently of Representative Gonzalez. While the FDIC
may consider covering some, see Bacon, FDIC Might Pay Freedom National Charity De-
positor, Wall St. J., Jan. 17, 1991, at B8, cols. 2-3, or all of the Freedom National Bank
depositors, see Castro, FDIC May Cover Freedom National Deposits in Full, Wall St. J.,
Jan. 11, 1991, at A5C, col. 3, several groups have filed a lawsuit against the FDIC claim-
ing that they were never told that the insurance limit was per-depositor rather than per-
account. See Lambert & Stevens, Charity, Religious Groups Sue FDIC Over Freedom
National Accounts, Wall St. J., Jan. 21, 1991, at B6, col. 2.
214. See Greenspan Testimony, supra note 210, at 6. In determining the coverage of
an account held in trust, each beneficiary of the account is insured up to $100,000.
The Treasury Department's banking reform plans propose a per-individual, per-bank
$100,000 account plus one retirement account (for a total of $200,000) limit on insurance.
See Labaton, A Proposal to Limit FD.LC., N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1991, at D23, col. 6;
Labaton, White House Proposes Curbs on Insured Deposits, N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1991, § 1,
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insurance by individual rather than by account is whether such a system
could be effectively implemented and policed."' Specifically, any per-
individual proposal would have to consider the extra reporting burdens
placed on individual institutions, the extensive record-keeping imposed
on the FDIC, and the privacy and security issues raised by maintaining
records necessary to police per-individual limits.26
More importantly, any form of insurance coverage reduction, whether
the imposition of a lower ceiling or the imposition of a per-individual
limit, may lead to "increased instability in banking markets."2 ' These
proposals might, for example, encourage large depositors to withdraw
their money from banks, thus causing runs of uninsured deposits.2" 8 The
overall cost of financial services to the economy would then increase 9
and United States banks would correspondingly compete less favorably
in the international market.' Additionally, the existence of too-big-to-
fail 2 1 prompts small banks to oppose most plans to reduce deposit-insur-
ance coverage.' m They argue that depositors would believe that deposits
in large banks would continue to be fully protected regardless of the
rules. This would cause small banks to lose depositors'm and would
erode the competitive balance between the two groups of institutions. 4
3. "Haircut" Coverage
The American Bankers Association ("ABA") has presented a deposit-
insurance reform proposal that gives depositors a "haircut.)' '  Under
at 28, col. 5. The plan also includes a proposal to study implementing a nationwide limit
over five years. See Labaton, A Proposal to Limit F.D.L C, N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1991, at
D23, col. 6; Labaton, White House Proposes Curbs on Insured Deposits, N.Y. Times, Feb.
3, 1991, § 1, at 28, col. 5.
215. See, e.g., Greenspan Testimony, supra note 210, at 6 (Federal Reserve Board's
concerns about the costs and complexity of the proposal); Reischauer House Testimony,
supra note 90, at 11 (expressing CBO's concerns about implementing a per individual
limit).
216. See Seidman M, supra note 193, at 15.
217. Id.
218. See Greenspan Testimony, supra note 210, at 6; Reischauer House Testimony,
supra note 90, at 11.
There might even be runs on insured deposits based solely on rumor. For example, the
Old Stone Corporation was subject to a run on deposits, even though it was perfectly
healthy, after a CNN story on Rhode Island bank failures used a branch of Old Stone as a
backdrop. See Lohr, Troubled Banks and the Role of the Press, N.Y. Times, Feb. 18,
1991, at 33, col. 2.
219. See Reischauer House Testimony, supra note 90, at 12.
220. See Seidman III, supra note 193, at 15.
221. See supra notes 185-198 and accompanying text.
222. See Panel to Consider Deposit Insurance Overhaul, L.A. Times, Feb. 15, 1990, at
D2, col. 4.
223. See Duke, S&L Mess May Spark A Thorough Overhaul of Deposit Insurance, Wall
St. J., July 3, 1990, at A5, col. 1; Panel to Consider Deposit Insurance Overhaul, LA.
Times, Feb. 15, 1990, at D2, col. 4.
224. See Seidman III, supra note 193, at 15.
225. The ABA's proposal actually includes many provisions in addition to the
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the proposal, which contemplates too-big-to-fail as a foregone conclu-
sion, all uninsured depositors, i.e., depositors with accounts over
$100,000, would be forced to suffer a loss, whether or not the bank was
too big to fail.226 The proposal calls for approximately five to fifteen per-
cent 227 to be shaved off228 FDIC reimbursements of any amount over
$100,000.229 Thus, if the haircut percentage was ten percent, a person
with $200,000 in an account would recover only $190,000.2 °
This proposal has several benefits. First, it recognizes political reali-
ties. Congress is fearful of alienating the politically strong bankers'
lobby, yet is eager to limit BIF's liability.23' Even assuming the existence
of too-big-to-fail, this proposal would accomplish these goals because the
FDIC would no longer fully insure large deposits and all banks would be
treated equally. The FDIC has commented that the proposal "resolves
many of the administrative hurdles that reduce the likelihood that losses
will be imposed on uninsured depositors in major banks.123 2 The propo-
sal also encourages increased depositor discipline at a relatively modest
potential depositor loss. This, in turn, should encourage prudent bank-
ing practices and discourage excessive risk.23 Further, imposing a hair-
cut reduces the risk of a large bank failure and helps equalize the
treatment of large and small banks. 234 Finally, the proposal would mini-
mize the costs of deposit insurance in terms of both BIF liability and the
fees charged to the banking institutions.23 5
The FDIC warns, however, that the haircut proposal has serious
drawbacks.23 6 The first concern deals with the provision's effects on cor-
respondent banks.237 Banks, often as part of check-cashing arrange-
mandatory haircut. See Seidman I, supra note 53, app. II at 2. For the purposes of this
Note, however, only the haircut provisions are considered.
226. See id. at 3.
227. The proposal calls for the percentage to be based on the FDIC's average rate of
losses in past resolutions. See id. at 2.
228. Hence the term "haircut."
229. See id.; Duke, S&L Mess May Spark A Thorough Overhaul of Deposit Insurance,
Wall St. J., July 3, 1990, at A5, col. 1.
230. This is similar to the guarantees that the Italian deposit insurance program pro-
vides. The Italian Government fully insures accounts of 200 million lira, and 75% of the
next 800 million lira. See Sibley, How the Europeans Do It, Wall St. J., Aug. 29, 1990, at
A6 (table); see also id. (discussion of European countries' deposit insurance systems).
231. See Duke, S&L Mess May Spark A Thorough Overhaul of Deposit Insurance, Wall
St. J., July 3, 1990, at Al, col. 6.
232. Seidman I, supra note 53, app. II at 3.
233. See Greenspan Testimony, supra note 210, at 7; Seidman I, supra note 53, app. II
at 3.
234. See Seidman I, supra note 53, app. II at 3.
235. See id.
236. See id. at app. II at 4-5, 15-18.
237. A correspondent bank is "[a] larger bank that sells its service(s) to other, smaller
respondent banks or financial institutions from which it receives fees or compensating




ments, have accounts at other banks." This is especially true of smaller
banks that usually hold correspondent balances at the large banks in
their district in order to clear checks.239 The FDIC predicts that if the
haircut proposal is adopted, the smaller banks would potentially face
losses that could cause bank runs, liquidity crises or insolvency." °
The ABA counters that because banks only incur losses that are a per-
centage of their total uninsured balance, the actual impact on the net
worth of a depositing bank would be de minimis.241 The ABA contends
that if a ten percent haircut had been in place at the time of the Conti-
nental Illinois resolution,242 only two banks would have suffered losses
exceeding fifty percent of their capital and none would have been ren-
dered insolvent.2 43 The FDIC refutes this contention, however, noting
that check-clearing systems involve large amounts of money and that if
an economic downturn affected a region, a small bank might not be able
to find a completely safe bank for its check-clearing services.'" Further-
more, the agency argues that a small community bank could be rendered
insolvent if it were forced to move its check-clearing business from one
failing bank to another, each time taking a mandatory haircut.24 5
Both the FDIC and the Federal Reserve contend that the ABA plan
creates incentives for runs on uninsured depositors."' If a particular
bank fails in a distressed region, depositors at other regional banks might
fear that their banks are in danger of failing, perhaps based solely on
rumor, and withdraw their monies.247 Thus, the FDIC claims that while
the ABA system would protect runs of small depositors, which are not
threatening to an institution, it would expose the industry to runs on
healthy institutions by large uninsured depositors."4 8 The ABA, on the




242. The ABA suggests that one reason the FDIC implemented "too-big-to-fail" in
resolving Continental Illinois was because a large number of banks, 976, had deposits
over $100,000. See id.
243. See id.
244. See id. app. II at 4-5.
The FDIC acknowledges, in a footnote, that small banks could utilize the Federal
Reserve for check clearing. See id. app. II at 5 n.2. The FDIC argues, however, that
check clearing is a profitable business for the larger banks and that it is inappropriate to
further weaken a distressed regional bank by eliminating such business. See id.
245. The FDIC report notes that during a three-year period, nine of the ten largest
banks in Texas were closed or assisted. See id. app. II at 5. Thus, its scenario of a bank
being rendered insolvent by taking haircuts in numerous shifts of its check processing is
not unfathomable. See id.
246. See Seidman I, supra note 53, app. II at 6; see also Greenspan Testimony, supra
note 210, at 7 (discussing the consequences of an ABA-type plan).
This point seems even more forceful in light of depositors' willingness to withdraw
their funds based solely on unfounded conjecture. See, eg., supra note 218 (discussing
run on Old Stone Bank in Rhode Island).




other hand, assumes that there would be greater stability among unin-
sured depositors because these depositors would be certain of their poten-
tial losses.249 The FDIC and Federal Reserve question this assumption
and argue that a depositor would join a bank run so long as the transac-
tion costs of moving funds are less than the potential losses.25
0
Thus, the haircut proposal is attractive and should remain open for
discussion.251 The potential increased instability, however, might under-
mine the overall goal of deposit insurance.
C. Structural Reforms
The six proposals included in this final category call for some struc-
tural reform in the banking industry. The first two proposals relate to
operation of the insurance fund, the second two relate to the operation of
the regulators and the final two relate to the operation of the banks.
1. BIF's Structure
a. Risk-Based Assessments
FIRREA requires federal regulators to study a system of risk-based
premiums.212 If established, risk-based premiums would establish a pre-
mium structure "that would consider asset quality risk, interest rate risk
and the quality of management, profitability as well as capital" of an
insured bank.253 Unlike private insurers, who determine what level of
risk to insure in setting premiums,254 federal deposit insurance is cur-
rently unconditional;251 that is, every insured member pays the same pre-
mium regardless of risk.2 6 Thus, bankers who might otherwise be
prudent are encouraged to take risks in order to remain competitive with
other, more reckless, banks. Also, under the current system, all members
of the banking industry pay for the risky members, rather than the risky
parties paying for themselves.257
249. See id.
250. See id.; see also Greenspan Testimony, supra note 210, at 7 (arguing that similar
approach would lead to increased instability).
251. Although the Treasury Department stated that it found the ABA proposal attrac-
tive and considered the idea, see Bacon, Treasury Plan to Favor Easing Bank Oversight,
Wall St. J., Dec. 7, 1990, at A4, col. 2, it was not included as part of the reform proposal.
Cf. Labaton, Administration Presents its Plan for Broad Overhaul of Banking, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 6, 1991, at D6, col. 2-4 (table) (outlining major parts of Treasury plan).
252. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 1001(b)(1)(A)-(B), 103 Stat. at 507 (to be codified at
12 U.S.C. § 1811(b)(1)(A)-(B)).
253. H.R. Rep. No. 54(I), 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 475, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 86, 271.
254. Additionally, a private insurer reviews the policy periodically to determine pre-
mium adjustments to reflect a change in insured risk. See Reischauer House Testimony,
supra note 90, at 9.
255. See id. at 11.
256. See 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b) (1988) (amended by FIRREA, supra note 1,
§§ 201(a)(1), 208(4), 208(6), 103 Stat. at 187, 207-12, 212-13).
257. In contrast, many states have an "assigned risk pool" of motor vehicle drivers.
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At first glance, risk-based premiums are extremely attractive. Overly
aggressive institutions would pay higher premiums commensurate with
the risks they take much in the way a private insurer would charge a
reckless venture higher premiums. On the other hand, a prudent opera-
tion would be able to remain competitive with risky banks because it
would have lower expenses.25
The current risk-based premium proposals, however, have numerous
drawbacks. First, they would not encourage banks to diversify their
portfolios, which could lead a number of banks to invest only in a limited
number of assets. If one of the limited markets collapses, the lack of
diversification that risk-based premiums encourage could result in in-
creased bank failures. In addition, Lawrence White has noted that "the
science of rating investment risks [is] quite primitive."" 9 Therefore, it is
possible for risky investments to avoid being penalized because they are
located within a broad category that is considered safe, such as commer-
cial real estate. 26" Furthermore, if troubled institutions are charged
higher premiums, their deterioration would only increase.26'
Additionally, for such a plan to be effective, regulators must be able to
evaluate various bank loan portfolios accurately, a task that even propo-
nents of the system recognize as problematic.262 In today's "more vola-
tile"263 markets, it is difficult for regulators even to determine which
banks are in danger of complete failure.211 Thus, regulators would face
The purpose of this fund is for drivers that are considered higher risks to pay higher
premiums and for all drivers in this category to pay for each other's carelessness.
258. Cf Reischauer House Testimony, supra note 90, at 10 (insurance premiums are
"pass[ed] on to customers through higher fees for financial services").
259. PasselU, Banking's Reins: Too Tight and Too Loose, N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1990, at
D4, col. 3.
260. See id. at D4, cols. 3-4.
261. See Labaton, Shift Asked on Bank Insurance, N.Y. Times, Dec. 19, 1990, at D6,
col. 5.
262. The proponents recognize that "'not every risk can be quantified and that risks
can change over time."' Sandy, Wide-Ranging Reforms Proposed to Repair Deposit In-
surance, [Bulletin 6] Control of Banking (P-H) 6.1, at 2 (Sept. 14, 1990) (quoting Rep.
Henry Gonzalez, Chairman, House Banking Committee); see also Labaton, Shift Asked
on Bank Insurance, N.Y. Times, Dec. 19, 1990, at D6, col. 5 (FDIC issued study in 1983
"particularly critical" of Government's ability to figure out efficient way of setting risk-
based premiums); Labaton, Treasury Urges Restrictions on Bank Deposit Insurance, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 27, 1990, at D2, col. 2 (Robert Glauber, the Under Secretary of the Treas-
ury, acknowledging the difficulty in determining levels of risk).
263. Deposit Insurance Hearings II, supra note 53, at 17 (statement of R. Dan Brum-
baugh, Jr., Senior Fellow, Stanford University Center for Economic Growth); see also
Seidman I, supra note 53, app. I at 5 (volatility is on the increase).
264. See Industry Condition Hearings, supra note 94, at 12 (statement of Mr. Bowsher,
United States Comptroller General).
For example, the GAO uncovered instances in which twenty-two banks failed without
ever being placed on the problem list, while another nine banks were placed on the list
only shortly before they failed. See id. at 18 (statement of Sen. Heinz).
Perhaps the regulators could take a lesson from television's David Letterman, who
suggests the following guidelines:
Top Ten Signs That Your Bank is Failing
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serious difficulties in gauging portfolio risks accurately in order for risk-
based premiums to be successful.265
In an attempt to answer this particular criticism, Senator Alan Dixon
introduced a bill2 66 during the last Congressional session that would cre-
ate a system of risk-based insurance with premiums set by private insur-
ers.2 67 Under the proposal, the FDIC would sell ten percent of the
insurance risk to private insurers,26 8 who would then assess the risk and
set the premiums.269 Senator Dixon hoped that the proposal would
" 'guarantee that federal deposit insurance rates reflect marketplace reali-
ties.' ,,270 This proposal, however, also has limitations. First, it is not
clear that private insurers would participate in the program.271 Second,
the proposal assumes that private insurers are better than the regulators
at assessing risk and would accurately assess risk in the banking industry.
Theoretically, however, regulators are experts in banking and it is unwise
to assume that private industry could successfully assess a risk better
than the regulators.272
Overall, while the idea of risk-based assessments is appealing, there are
10. Free handful of Cheetos with every new account.
9. They hand out calendars one month at a time.
8. Security guard offers to walk you back to your office for five bucks.
7. Overhear branch manager muttering to himself, "I wonder if you can eat
squirrel?"
6. Free giveaway toaster is made by G.E.
5. Teller machine replaced by fat guy with carton of twenties.
4. You glimpse inside the vault and notice it's stacked with empty soda
bottles.
3. You deposit cash: an officer runs over, sticks it in pocket and dances
around yelling, "Lordy, we're having biscuits tonightl"
2. You recognize some of the tellers as carnival people.
1. They can't change a twenty.
Late Night With David Letterman (NBC television broadcast, Jan. 9, 1990).
265. The inability of regulators to recognize failing banks raises serious questions
about their ability to recognize risks in profitable banks.
Even experts have difficulty analyzing risks. For example, in the 1980s, many experts
were positive that the oil boom would continue. The bubble burst, however, causing
many Texas banks to fail. See Duke, S&L Mess May Spark Thorough Overhaul of Deposit
Insurance, Wall St. J., July 3, 1990, at A5, col. 3.
266. S. 3040, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 Cong. Rec. 13076-13082 (1990).
267. See Seidman Calls For Study of Bank Investments in BIF Bills Planned, 55 Bank-
ing Rep. (BNA) No. 11, at 431 (Sept. 17, 1990).
268. See id. There are also proposals that call for restructuring the insurance system
by having private insurers assume some of the FDIC's potential liability. See infra notes
273-293 and accompanying text. Senator Dixon's bill is one such proposal. For the pur-
poses of this section, however, Dixon's proposal is analyzed only with respect to the use
of private insurers to set the level of premium payments.
269. See Seidman Calls For Study of Bank Investments in BIF" Bills Planned, 55 Bank-
ing Rep. (BNA) No. 11, at 431 (Sept. 17, 1990).
270. Id.
271. In an attempt to solve this problem, Senator Dixon's bill includes a provision that
if after eight years there are not enough participating insurers, the FDIC would loan
money to the private banking industry to create a for-profit reinsurance subsidiary. See
id.
272. See supra notes 262-265 and accompanying text.
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serious questions about whether such proposals can be implemented pro-
ductively and whether such proposals are financially sound.
b. Private Insurers
Some proposals would modify BIFs structure by placing some or all
of the responsibility for insuring deposits in the private sector, either by
supplementing or completely replacing BIFs insurance guarantee with
private insurance policies.2 73 The proponents argue that the proposals
"preserve[] the best feature of the current insurance system-the high
confidence it gives depositors in the stability of our banking system-
while providing real marketplace discipline."' 74 This discipline would
presumably further discourage imprudent banking practices and limit
BIF's potential liability.
The drawbacks of the private insurance plans, aside from pricing and
administrative difficulties,27 5 are numerous. The underlying problem is
that "[p]rivate insurance and public responsibility unfortunately are not
always compatible."276 First, a program of private underwriters:
would require, of course, that all relevant supervisory information-
much of which is now held confidential-be shared with private insur-
ers who would be obligated to use that information only to evaluate the
risk of depositor insurance and not for the purposes of adjusting any of
their own portfolio options. 2'
In addition to this potential conflict of interest, it is possible that such an
extensive sharing of records could invade the right of privacy of the indi-
vidual depositors or creditors. 8
Second, the CBO warns that despite the hopes of the proponents of
private deposit insurance, increased market discipline could cause with-
drawals and effect bank runs.279 This would result because market
forces, while creating a more effective level of supervision, are also less
forgiving in reacting to imprudent practices.28 ' Moreover, the GAO sug-
gests that private systems of insurance "have not generally been success-
ful, because they have not had sufficient financial resources to convince
the public that the insured banks were safe." 28' The recent failure of the
273. See, e.g., S. 3040, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 Cong. Rec. 13076-82 (bill requiring
10% of large banks' deposits be insured by private insurance); Seidman I, supra note 53,
at 26-27 (discussing three private insurance proposals).
274. 136 Cong. Rec. S13075 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1990) (statement of Sen. Dixon).
Other proponents even suggest that "anything short of a private insurance mechanism
is doomed to fail." Consultant Calls for P'vate Insurance Mechanism to Replace Federal
Deposit Insurance, 54 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 20, at 864 (May 21, 1990).
275. See Seidman I, supra note 53, at 27.
276. Greenspan Testimony, supra note 210, at 8.
277. Id. at 7-8.
278. See Seidman III, supra note 193, at 15.
279. See Reischauer House Testimony, supra note 90, at 14.
280. See id.
281. Statement of Richard L. Fogel, Assistant Comptroller General, General Account-
ing Office, Deposit Insurance and Related Reforms Before the House Comm. on Bank-
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Rhode Island private insurance system282 amplifies this last concern 283
and has resulted in numerous bills to bar private insurance. 28 4
Furthermore, it is unlikely and unreasonable to expect that private in-
surers would consider those macroeconomic factors that are the proper
focus of deposit insurance.2 5 For example, it may be more prudent, in
some circumstances, to assist a troubled institution than to liquidate it.
Private insurers, however, are not likely to consider this alternative.286
Also, while "public good ' 2 7 would sometimes suggest that all deposits
should be fully reimbursed,288 private insurers would probably pay de-
positors only up to the explicitly stated insurance limit.28 9 Finally,
although withdrawing from a distressed market would be reasonable for
a private insurance company, such withdrawal would be "counter-
productive" in the deposit insurance context. 2 °
In short, private insurance is unlikely to relieve the Government, and
consequently the taxpayer, from potential liability.291 An underwriting
error or a systematic industry failure would cripple insurance companies'
ability to pay their policies and ultimately taxpayers would continue to
remain liable.292 The proposals would fail to lessen the Government's
supervisory role as well: to continue to control improper activity, any
decreased supervision of the banks would be counterbalanced by in-
creased supervision of the private insurers.293
ing, Finance and Urban Affairs 20 (Sept. 19, 1990) (General Accounting Office press
release) [hereinafter Fogel Testimony]; see also Hearings on Deposit Insurance Reform
Before the House Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs Comm., 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 8
(Feb. 21, 1990) (commenting that the Ohio attempt at private deposit insurance failed
and that no system of private insurance has been successful).
282. See Bradsher, 45 Credit Unions and Banks Shut by Rhode Island, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 2, 1991, at Al, col. 3; Ingrassia, Rhode Island Governor Closes 45 Institutions, Wall
St. J., Jan. 2, 1991, at A3, col. 4.
283. See Bradsher, 45 Credit Unions and Banks Shut by Rhode Island, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 2, 1991, at D2, col. 5.
284. See Pulliam, U.S. and States Beginning to Draft Bills Barring Private Credit Union
Insurance, Wall St. J., Jan. 11, 1991, at A4, col. 1; see also Rubens, Private Deposit Insur-
ance Isn't the Answer, Wall St. J., Jan. 16, 1991, at A14, cols. 3-5 (privatization of federal
deposit insurance will not solve banking problems).
285. See Greenspan Testimony, supra note 210, at 8.
286. See Reischauer House Testimony, supra note 90, at 14.
287. Id. at 11.
288. Full protection of deposits is one of the consequences of "too-big-to-fail." See
supra notes 185-198 and accompanying text.
289. See Reischauer House Testimony, supra note 90, at 11.
290. See Greenspan Testimony, supra note 210, at 8.
291. The failure of the Rhode Island Share and Deposit Indemnity Corporation, see
supra notes 282-284 and accompanying text, reinforced this proposition. See Rubens,
Private Deposit Insurance Isn't the Answer, Wall St. J., Jan. 16, 1991, at A14, col. 3.
292. See id.; Seidman I, supra note 53, at 27. This is likely to be the outcome in the
Rhode Island private insurance failure. See Rubens, Private Deposit Insurance Isn't the
Answer, Wall St. J., Jan. 16, 1991, at A14, col. 3.




a. Increased Supervision and Regulation
Business people will always make bad loans and investments; nothing
can prevent them from making these unwise judgments. While banking
regulations may proscribe certain activities, it is only through appropri-
ate supervision that regulations can be enforced, unsound activities re-
strained and losses to BIF limited. Several proposals to reform the
regulatory and supervisory powers of banking regulators have been pro-
posed, including: introduction of required annual on-site examinations,
creation of a uniform dividend policy that would apply to all troubled
institutions, development of a common test for evaluating loans and as-
signing resident examiners to all large banks."9 Additionally, plans to
streamline the current "overlapping and redundant" regulatory structure
have been proposed.295
There is a general consensus 296 that these proposals would improve the
banking regulatory structure by enhancing detection of potential
problems. A conflict arises, however, in determining the level of discre-
tion the bank regulator may exercise. There appear to be two ap-
proaches: (1) statutorily defined actions and procedures, with some
regulatory flexibility or (2) maintenance of the regulator's discretion. 219
As for the first approach, the Federal Reserve ("Fed") has stated that
294. See Testimony of L. William Seidman, Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, on Deposit Insurance Reform Before the House Subcomm. on Commerce,
Consumer, and Monetary Affairs of the Comm. on Government Operations 6 (Oct. 3,
1990) (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation press release) [hereinafter Seidman IV];
see also Deposit Insurance Hearings II, supra note 53, at 4 (statement of Mr. Gramling,
Director, Corporate Financial Audits, Accounting and Financial Management, United
States GAO) (supporting on-site examinations); Fogel Testimony, supra note 281, at 13
(same); Wayne, Key Man at Banking Crossroads, N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1990, at D9, cols.
4-5 (supporting examinations and dividend policy).
295. Seidman I, supra note 193, at 17; see, eg., Labaton, Plan to Pare Financial Su-
pervision, N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1991, at Dl, col. 6 (Treasury proposal for "super regula-
tor"); id. at D8, col. 6 (Representative Gonzalez introduced bill to create "super
regulator"); see also supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text (describing current regula-
tory structure).
296. The Treasury expected that its proposed plan for a "super regulator" would be
backed by a consensus of the regulators. See Labaton, Plan to Pare Financial Supervision,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1991, at D8, col. 2. The final plan calls for two regulatory agencies,
one for state banks and one for national banks, and the removal of the FDIC as regulator.
See Bacon, Big Banks Would Get Vastly Broader Powers Under Treasury's Plan, Wall St.
J., Feb. 6, 1991, at D6, col. 3-4 (table). The FDIC has expressed its opposition to the
removal of all its "powers to protect the insurance fund." Bacon, Treasury's Plan to
Overhaul Banking Could Diminish Fed's Regulatory Role, Wall St. J., Feb. 8, 1991, at A4,
col. 1 (quoting Chairman Seidman).
297. See infra notes 298-310 and accompanying text.
Compare Greenspan Testimony, supra note 210, at 15-17 (advocating limitation of reg-




supervisory responses must occur "promptly and firmly. ' '298 Chairman
Greenspan argues that, while "some flexibility" is required, there "must
be a prescribed set of responses and a presumption that these responses
will be applied ... [e]ven though prompt corrective action implies some
limit on the discretion of supervisors to delay for reasons that they per-
ceive to be in the public interest."2 99 For example, the Fed suggested
that, absent an affirmative act by the regulator, some statutorily dictated
remedial action should be imposed when a bank fails to meet minimum
required capital levels.3"° Specifically, Chairman Greenspan proposed
that Congress design a system that would require regulators to initiate
forced mergers, divestitures and conservatorships of inadequately capi-
talized institutions. 01 While current law authorizes regulators to take
these actions, the power is "discretionary and dependent" upon a show-
ing of an illegal act or some unsafe or unsound condition.3 " The Fed
argues that removal of this discretion would introduce greater consis-
tency into the banking industry and provide management with clearer
notice. 03 Overall, by requiring specified standard actions, the proposal
would limit the regulators' ability to allow sagging bank positions to de-
teriorate further.3 4
The FDIC, on the other hand, while supporting enhanced supervi-
sion,3 °0 argues that the savings-and-loan crisis has wrongly resulted in a
"bad name" for discretion. 3°  Chairman Seidman commented that the
298. Greenspan Testimony, supra note 210, at 15.
This view, explicitly defining corrective action, is also supported by Robert E. Litan of
the Brookings Institution. See Quint, Experts Suggest Cures for an Ailing Bank System,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 1, 1991, at 42, col. 4.
299. Greenspan Testimony, supra note 210, at 15; see also Fogel Testimony, supra note
281, at 12 ("To achieve earlier, more forceful intervention, the discretion available to
regulators in taking actions ... should be narrowed."); Bacon, Quicker Regulatory Action
to Combat Risky Banking Practices Urgedby GAO, Wall St. J., Mar. 5, 1991, at A18, col.
1 (GAO suggests "'trip-wire' approach to regulation").
300. See Greenspan Testimony, supra note 210, at 15-16.
301. See id. at 16; see also Regulate Banks: Less, and More, N.Y. Times, Dec. 10, 1990,
at A18, col. 2 (Treasury considering options in which requiring regulatory action in cer-
tain circumstances is essential).
Senator Riegle similarly proposes that "if a bank falls below its required level of capital
it must suspend dividend payments, limit its growth and file a plan to restore its
financial condition. If it fails to follow the plan, then it must suspend bonuses to execu-
tives." Labaton, New Banking Restrictions Are Proposed, N.Y. Times, Mar. 6, 1991, at
Dl, col. 6 (emphasis added).
302. Greenspan Testimony, supra note 210, at 16-17.
303. See id. at 17.
304. See id. at 15; see also Bacon, Bruised by the S&L Fiasco, Lawmakers Now Try to
Show They are Born Again Bank Guardians, Wall St. J., Mar. 19, 1991, at A26, col. 1
("'We wouldn't be facing a deposit-insurance crisis if the regulators had acted promptly
to prevent bank failures, rather than allowing problem banks to fester into catastrophic
failures.'" (quoting Rep. Annunzio)); Regulate Banks: Less, and More, N.Y. Times, Dec.
10, 1990, at A18, col. 2 ("[m]andatory intervention was missing during the 1980's," per-
mitting savings associations to get into deeper trouble).
305. See Seidman III, supra note 193, at 18.
306. Id. at 19.
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savings-and-loan crisis was not induced by excessive discretion, but
rather by savings-and-loan regulators who acted as "cheerleaders" of the
industry and abandoned their independence." 7 Chairman Seidman ar-
gued that reducing discretion would "curtail the ability of the bank su-
pervisors to seek the least costly or least disruptive way of handling bank
difficulties."3 ' He believes that "supervisory discretion has contributed
enormously to the stability of the financial system."'3 9 Additionally, the
FDIC states that promptness and decisiveness can be effectively achieved
in a system that permits the regulators to maintain their current level of
discretion. 310
The first approach appears to be the better alternative. It permits
some flexibility while simultaneously mandating prompt action through
explicitly described corrective measures. Therefore, this approach avoids
the pitfalls of discretion, such as imprudently delaying action.
b. Cross-Guarantee Provisions
The cross-guarantee provisions,31' originally enacted under FIR-
REA,312 provide that an insured financial institution may be liable for
the losses of its failed or failing affiliates. The provisions effectively in-
demnify the FDIC for the costs incurred in assisting or seizing the "com-
monly controlled" 31 3 insured institution. 314  This liability is expressly
superior to any obligations or liabilities owed to shareholders 315 or affili-




310. See id. at 18-19.
311. The cross-guarantee provisions relate to "[a]ny insured depository institution,"
that is, to insured members of both SAIF and BIF. FIRREA, supra note 1,
§ 206(a)(7)(e)(1)(A), 103 Stat. at 201 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1815(e)(1)(A)).
312. See id. § 206(a)(7)(e), 103 Stat. at 201 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. 1815(e)).
313. Two depository institutions are "commonly controlled" if they are controlled by
the same holding company or if one institution controls the other institution. See id.
§ 206(a)(7)(e)(9), 103 Stat. at 205 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1815(e)(9)). The condi-
tions for "control" are defined in 12 U.S.C. § 1843(f) (1988)(amended by FIRREA,
supra note 1, §§ 603(b), 604(b), 1219, 103 Stat. at 410, 411, 546).
314. See id. § 206(a)(7)(e)(1)(A)(i), 103 Stat. at 201 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1815(e)(1)(A)(i)).
For example, if Banks A and B are owned by holding company C and the FDIC pro-
vides assistance to A to prevent it from failing, the FDIC may, under the cross-guarantee
provisions, "bill" B for its costs. In addition, the FDIC's claims are superior to C's. See
infra notes 315-316.
Effective May 30, 1990, the FDIC adopted a policy statement setting out guidelines
that it will use in assessing liability. See 55 Fed. Reg. 21,935 (1990); see also Liability
Policy Set By FDIC Board on Institutions with Common Control, 54 Banking Rep. (BNA)
No. 21, at 900 (May 28, 1990) (discussing liability guidelines).
315. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 206(a)(7)(e)(2)(C)(i)(I), 103 Stat. at 202 (to be codi-
fied at 12 U.S.C. § 1815(e)(2)(C)(i)(I)).




the cross-guarantee provisions, hoping to prevent a holding company
from "loot[ing]" its bank operation, leaving the Government to foot the
bill. 3
17
FDIC Chairman Seidman expressed concern that the cross-guarantee
provisions could be avoided through:
[t]he ingenuity of lawyers... in that people can wait until a bank is
about to fail, sell it just before it fails, and then the cross-guarantee
provisions don't apply. Or they can have transactions between the
holding company and the bank which have the effect of penalizing
[BIF].... [W]e need some loophole closing in that area. 31
Similarly, the GAO argues that laws making a bank holding company
liable for deposit-insurance costs associated with its bank entities "should
definitely be implemented." '319
Despite the concerns over loopholes in the current law, more funda-
mental problems with the cross-guarantee provisions exist: the current
law is inherently unfair and not clearly constitutional. 320 The law per-
mits the FDIC to impose liability on healthy institutions without regard
to whether they were operated independently of the failed bank and
notwithstanding the absence of fraudulent transactions. 21 This bright-
line approach may lead to inequitable results in certain situations in
which the law applies.
For example, the FDIC may waive cross-guarantee liability only
where "the Corporation determines that such exemption is in the best
interests of [BIF]." 322 A literal interpretation of the statute323 could con-
ceivably make a waiver based on a finding of an entity's good faith imper-
missible because good faith is not a permitted exception.324
Furthermore, if an assessment of liability would only weaken, not bank-
rupt, a sister bank, the FDIC could easily impose cross-guarantee liabil-
ity. Accordingly, the entity would be liable for a failure of a separate
legal entity, without having acted to cause that failure.
Theoretically, because the FDIC waiver authority is discretionary, 325
the Corporation could cause the failure of otherwise healthy banks, as
long as the FDIC finds that not waiving liability would serve the best
interests of BIF.326 In light of the tremendous political pressure caused
317. 136 Cong. Rec. H7185 (daily ed. Sept. 5, 1990) (statement of Rep. Gonzalez).
318. Oversight Hearings, supra note 19, at 9 (statement of FDIC Chairman Seidman).
319. Fogel Testimony, supra note 281, at 21.
320. See infra notes 322-337 and accompanying text.
321. See infra notes 322-329 and accompanying text.
322. FIRREA, supra note 1, § 206(7)(e)(5)(A), 103 Stat. at 203 (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1815(e)(5)(A)).
323. For the moment, any constitutional challenges are ignored, but they are discussed
infra notes 330-337 and accompanying text.
324. Accordingly, the guidelines for liability adopted by the FDIC permit waivers only
if "the exemption is in the best [financial] interests of either of the insurance funds." 55
Fed. Reg. 21,934, 21,935 (1990).




by the savings-and-loan bailout, the FDIC is more likely to assert cross-
guarantees even where such action could ultimately result in the failure
of additional banks.3 27 Even if the sister bank would not fail, the guaran-
tee provisions create a contingent risk to healthy institutions that is diffi-
cult to monitor or measure. This risk would undoubtedly lower the
bank's market value.32
Finally, if the FDIC could show that the entities were not operated
independently or that fraudulent transfers occurred, no court would have
difficulty in holding the affiliate liable under traditional principles of
law.329 Absent this finding, however, the logic of cross-guarantees is
elusive.
Aside from the asserted inequity of cross-guarantees, these provisions
are also open to constitutional challenge. Enforcement of the cross-guar-
antee may constitute a taking of property without just compensation33'
in violation of the fifth amendment. 331 To date, no court has confronted
this issue, apparently because the FDIC dropped the one case in which it
asserted its cross-guarantee power.332 Although the constitutional issue
is implicated in cases in which the FDIC attempts to force affiliates to
support an ailing bank,333 the courts in these cases have based their deci-
sions on statutory grounds.33 Now that Congress has explicitly pro-
327. See, e.g., Gifford, NBW's Rescue May Be Charged to Sister Banks, Legal Times,
Sept. 24, 1990, at 11, coL 4 (suggesting the provision does not make sense when another
bank is forced into insolvency).
The FDIC waiver guidelines require that an institution "must demonstrate that its
viability would be seriously jeopardized by such liability and that the loss to the FDIC
funds would be greater than the loss from the one failure." 55 Fed. Reg. 21,934, 21,936
(1990) (emphasis added).
328. This assertion rests on an economic theory that a rational purchaser carefully
factors all contingencies into the value of an institution. Thus, a contingent liability
would lower the price such a purchaser would be willing to pay for such an institution.
329. See, e.g., Gentry v. Credit Plan Corp., 528 S.W.2d 571, 573 (Tex. 1975) ("[TIhe
corporate fiction may be disregarded to prevent fraud or injustice."); Zaist v. Olson, 154
Conn. 563, 573, 227 A.2d 552, 557 (1967) ("Courts will disregard the fiction of separate
legal entity when a corporation 'is a mere instrumentality or agent of another corporation
or individual owning all or most of its stock.' ") (quoting Hoffman Wall Paper Co. v.
Hartford, 114 Conn. 531, 535, 159 A. 346, 348 (1932)).
330. Compare Glass, Cross-Guarantee Is Seen as Risk to Holding Companies, Am.
Banker, July 19, 1990, at 25, cols. 2-4 (suggesting regulation may be unconstitutional)
with Curtis, The Takings Clause and Regulatory Takeovers of Banks and Thrifts, 27
Harv. J. on Legis. 367, 389 (1990) (suggesting regulation is not unconstitutional).
331. See U.S. Const. amend. V.
332. See Gifford, NBW's Rescue May Be Charged to Sister Banks, Legal Times, Sept.
24, 1990, at 11, col. 4.
333. See, e.g., Senior Unsecured Creditors' Comm. of First RepublicBank Corp. v.
Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 749 F. Supp. 758, 760 (N.D. Tex. 1990) (plaintiffs claim
FDIC's action violated the United States Constitution); Curtis, The Takings Clause and
Regulatory Takeovers of Banks and Thrifts, 27 Harv. J. on Legis. 367, 389 (1990) (noting
plaintiffs in another case also raised taking issue).
334. See, e.g., Mcorp Fin., Inc. v. Board of Governors Fed. Reserve Sys., 900 F.2d 852,
863 (5th Cir. 1990), cert granted, 111 S.Ct. 1101 (1991) (Nos. 90-913, 90-914) (requiring
a holding company to transfer assets to a troubled subsidiary is beyond the Board's statu-
tory authority); Senior Unsecured Creditors' Comm. of First RepublicBank Corp. v. Fed-
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vided for cross-guarantees, however, the Constitution provides the only
basis upon which parties may challenge the FDIC.33 There are several
tests for determining whether a taking is constitutional3 36 but it is un-
clear which one a court would apply and what result the court would
reach. 3
37
In short, the cross-guarantees need to be amended to rectify their ineq-
uity and their possible unconstitutionality. The law should at least re-
quire a finding of fraud or collusion before imposing liability.
3. Banking Industry Structure
a. Capital Requirements
Capital is the cushion that forces a banker to exercise caution because
it places the owner's own money, rather than just the Government's, at
risk.338 Regulators and Congress have endorsed varying proposals 339
aimed at increasing the capital requirements for banks beyond those set
by international regulatory agreements that take effect in 1992.34  These
eral Deposit Ins. Corp., 749 F. Supp. 758, 775-776 (N.D. Tex. 1990) (refusing to dismiss
creditor's claims against FDIC despite claims that obtaining guarantees from affiliates
was within scope of FDIC's regulatory authority); Texas Am. Bancshares, Inc. v. Clarke,
740 F. Supp. 1243, 1254 (N.D. Tex. 1990) (summary judgment against FDIC, finding
actions violated 12 U.S.C. § 194).
The FDIC and RepublicBank subsequently settled their litigation. See Lancaster, First
RepublicBank and FDIC Reach Accord on Claims, Wall St. J., Dec. 12, 1990, at AlO, col.
1. The FDIC was seeking over one billion dollars to reimburse it for assistance provided
to sister banks. See Senior Unsecured Creditors, 749 F. Supp. at 761. The settlement
would call for RepublicBank to pay $158.2 million. See Lancaster, First RepublicBank
and FDIC Reach Accord on Claims, Wall St. J., Dec. 12, 1990, at A1O, col. 1.
335. See Curtis, The Takings Clause and Regulatory Takeovers of Banks and Thrifts,
27 Harv. J. on Legis. 367, 370 (1990).
336. See, eg., Connolly v. Pension Ben. Guaranty Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 224 (1986)
(upholding the constitutionality of amendments that increased the liability of employers
who withdraw from multi-employer pension plans); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982) ("permanent physical occupation authorized by
government is taking without regard to the public interests that it may serve").
337. Generally, the Supreme Court has "eschewed the development of any set formula
for identifying a 'taking' forbidden by the Fifth Amendment, and ha[s] relied instead on
ad hoc, factual inquiries into the circumstances of each particular case." See Connolly,
475 U.S. at 224; see also id. at 225 (identifying three factors of "particular significance" to
the taking inquiry); Curtis, The Takings Clause and Regulatory Takeovers of Banks and
Thrifts, 27 Harv. J. on Legis. 367, 370-75 (1990) (discussing applicability of various regu-
latory taking precedents).
338. See Deposit Insurance Hearings I, supra note 12, at 2 (statement of Rep.
Annunzio).
339. See, e.g., Seidman I, supra note 53, at 25 ("Capital serves to protect both individ-
ual banks and the deposit insurance system."); Hearings on the Regulators' Report on
Capital Standards Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (Sept. 10, 1990) [hereinafter Capital Standards Hearings] (state-
ment by Gov. Angell, Federal Reserve Board) (LEXIS, Nexis library, Fednews file) ("im-
portant benefits... would result from stronger capital requirements"); 136 Cong. Rec.
H7181 (daily ed. Sept. 5, 1990) (statement of Rep. Gonzalez) ("it is fatal to permit in-
sured institutions to operate with little or no capital").
340. The Basle Accord requires banks to have risk-based capital of 8% by 1992. See
S452 [Vol. 59
BANK INSURANCE FUND
parties, recognizing the decline of equity capital from fifteen to six per-
cent of assets,"l claim that "too many banking organizations... have
travelled too far down the road of operating with modest capital
levels., ,Mz
There are numerous justifications for increasing capital guidelines.
First, the owners and managers would have greater incentive to act pru-
dently because their own money would be at risk.3" This curtailment of
risk would result in a healthier banking industry and thus a healthier
insurance fund.3' Second, higher levels of capital would provide a
larger buffer between a bank's losses and BIF.3 " Third, with stricter
capital requirements, banks would face an additional "market test" in
convincing potential investors that their operation and practices are
sound.3' Fourth, increased capital standards might counter the subsidy
effect of the deposit guarantee,' 7 which allows poorly capitalized or
high-risk institutions to attract deposits and thus raises the costs of funds
to all banks, 3" resulting in a more efficient pricing of bank services.
Fifth, as Chairman Greenspan suggests, "[w]ell-capitalized banks are
best positioned to be successful." 3"  Finally, because today's markets are
much more volatile, there should be higher capital standards "as a mat-
ter of bank policy."' Thus, "[c]apital provides the best means of both
ensuring the continued stability of the banking system and limiting the
liability of the government from losses in failed financial institutions."'3 1
Because of the increased difficulty banks are experiencing in attracting
capital, an increase in capital requirements would present problems for
Capatides, Madam & Chan, Understanding the Risk-Based Capital Guidelines, 2 Banking
L. Rev. 5, 8 (1990).
Risk-based capital requirements factor various risk groups of assets to determine a
bank's capital adequacy. See T. Fitch, Dictionary of Banking Terms 532-33 (1990); see
also Capital Standards Hearings, supra note 339, at 12-13 (statement by Gov. Angell,
Federal Reserve) (discussing principles to be considered to best factor interest rates and
capital adequacy); Capatides, Madam & Chan, Understanding the Risk-Based Capital
Guidelines, 2 Banking L. Rev. 5, 10-11 (table) (1990) (explaining how interest rate risks
fit into the various weighted categories).
341. See Fogel Testimony, supra note 281, at 7; Benston, Radical Surgery for Dying
Banks, N.Y. Times, Dec. 14, 1990, at A39, cols. 2-3.
342. Greenspan Testimony, supra note 210, at 11.
343. See Capital Standards Hearings, supra note 339, at 12 (statement by Gov. Angel,
Federal Reserve Board).
344. Seidman I, supra note 53, at 25.
345. See Capital Standards Hearings, supra note 339, at 12 (statement by Gov. Angell,
Federal Reserve Board).
346. See id.
347. See Seidman I, supra note 53, at 25.
348. See Fogel Testimony, supra note 281, at 7.
349. Higher Capital Would Make Banks Less Campetitive Initially, Greenspan Says, 55
Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 8, at 291 (Aug. 20, 1990) (quoting Chairman Greenspan).
350. Deposit Insurance Hearings II, supra note 53, at 17 (statement of Mr. Litan, Se-
nior Fellow, Economic Studies, Brookings Institution).
351. Fogel Testimony, supra note 281, at 15-16 (emphasis in original).
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the industry.3 52 A combination of bad debts and increasingly stringent
regulator examinations has forced banks to increase their loan loss
reserves;353 these reserves, however, will no longer be allowed to be a
significant part of the bank's capital under the capital requirements im-
plementing the Basle Accord. 354 These changes have caused investors to
become wary and curtail investment until it is determined how badly the
industry will suffer. 355  The industry's increase of its loan reserves has
also caused the value of bank stocks to dissipate.3 56 No one supporting
the increases in capital, however, expects banks to be able to raise funds
cheaply or easily,357 nor do they expect increased capital standards to be
implemented in isolation of other changes.358 Furthermore, because the
capital requirement is a capital-assets ratio, a bank may curtail assets, e.g.
loans, in order to meet the requirement, rather than raise capital. Thus,
there is concern that increasing capital requirements would curtail lend-
ing activity, which is already experiencing a slowdown.359 Such a slow-
down could launch or lengthen a recession.
352. See Bleakley, Banks Find Their Sources of Capital are Drying Up, Wall St. J., Oct.
19, 1990, at Cl, col. 4; see also supra note 123 (discussing Citicorp's difficulties in raising
capital).
In an attempt to meet the new capital guidelines, Chase, along with other banks, has
been forced to sell off profitable operations. See White & Sesit, Bank Company Places a
Unit on the Block- Chase Manhattan is Seeking to Sell Investment Arm in a Bid to Boost
Capital, Wall St. J., Nov. 26, 1990, at A4, col. 1.
353. See Bleakley, Banks Find Their Sources of Capital are Drying Up, Wall St. J., Oct.
19, 1990, at Cl, col. 4.
354. See id.; Deposit Insurance Hearings I, supra note 12, at 19-20 (statement of Comp-
troller of the Currency Clarke).
355. See Bleakley, Banks Find Their Sources of Capital are Drying Up, Wall St. J., Oct.
19, 1990, at Cl, col. 4; Sease, Bank Stocks Sink on Fears Loan Problems Understated,
Wall St. J., Sept. 28, 1990, at Cl, cols. 5-6; see also Hilder, Bank Stocks Soar in Wake of
Fed Action, Wall St. J., Dec. 6, 1990, at Cl, col. 3 ("bank stocks have been among the
stock market's worst performers")
356. See Sease, Investors Expect to See Answers in 1991, Wall St. J., Jan. 2, 1991, at R3,
cols. 5-6 (table); Blealdey, Banks Find Their Sources of Capital are Drying Up, Wall St. J.,
Oct. 19, 1990, at Cl, col. 4; see also Hilder, Bank Stocks Soar in Wake of Fed Action,
Wall St. J., Dec. 6, 1990, at C5, col. 5 (recent increases in bank stocks probably tempo-
rary since they are still fundamentally poor).
357. See, e.g., Higher Capital Would Make Banks Less Competitive Initially, Greenspan
Says, 55 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 8, at 291 (Aug. 20, 1990) (it "will be neither easy nor
cheap" to meet higher capital requirements).
358. "Higher capital requirements should be accompanied by industry structural re-
forms." Seidman IV, supra note 294, at 7.
359. See Rosenbaum, Federal Reserve Acts to Increase Lending by Banks, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 5, 1990, at Al, col. 6; Bank Credit Tighter, Survey by Fed Finds, N.Y. Times, Nov.
20, 1990, at D2, col. 5; Quint, Banks Cut Business Lending Hurting Weakened Economy,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 16, 1990, at Al, col. 5.
The Federal Reserve reports that existing loans to business by banks have fallen almost
$5.2 billion in 1990. See id.
360. See Duke, Banks Toughen Loan Standards Even Further, Wall St. J., Nov. 20,
1990, at A2, col. 2; Quint, Few Buffers to a Slump Are Seen, N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1990, at
D1, col. 6; Quint, Banks Cut Business Lending, Hurting Weakened Economy, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 16, 1990, at Al, col. 5.
The Administration believes that tightening credit is contributing to the economic
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Despite these problems, a gradual phase-in of higher capital require-
ments36 would give banks sufficient time to raise their capital levels.
Once in place, the requirements would benefit both BIF and the individ-
ual banks. BIF would no longer face the possibility of a large number of
failing banks, and the industry would be better able to meet new opportu-
nities and changing circumstances.
b. Financial Deregulation
Bank regulators are urging Congress to make major changes in the
industry's structure that would enable banks to function and remain
competitive in a changing financial environment.362 Specifically, regula-
tors propose ending the various ownership and product limitations as
well as the geographic restraints currently placed on commercial
banks.363 Ending these limitations would hopefully lead to increased
bank profitability."' Because "[a] healthy deposit insurance system de-
slowdown, see Rosenbaum, Brady Warns Regulators About Credit, N.Y. Times, Nov. 21,
1990, at D1, col. 6, and has acknowledged that the country is in a recession. See Rosen-
baum, The White House Agrees: It's a Recession, N.Y. Times, Jan. 3, 1991, at DI, col. 3;
Murray, White House's Forecast Admits U.S. is in Recession, Wall St. J., Jan. 2, 1991, at
A3, col. 1.
361. Several regulators have proposed this gradual phase-in. See, e.g., Greenspan Tes-
timony, supra note 210, at 11 (proposing gradual phase-in); Seidman I, supra note 53, at
25 (same); Bacon, FDIC Says Insurance Fund Will Shrink to $4 Billion in '91 Without an
Infusion, Wall St. J., Dec. 17, 1990, at A4, col. 1 (discussing proposals).
362. See, e.g., Oral Statement of L. William Seidman, Chairman, Federal Deposit In-
surance Corporation, on Deposit Insurance Revision and Financial Services Restructur-
ing, Before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs 3 (July 31,
1990) (press release of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation) (urging repeal of nu-
merous banking laws); Greenspan Testimony, supra note 210, at 22 (recommending that
permissible range of activities for banks be broadened); Labaton, Administration Presents
its Plan for Broad Overhaul of Banking, N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1991, at Al, col. 1 (Treasury
proposes "sweeping overhaul" of banking system); Stein, Who Needs the Banks?, Wall St.
J., Jan. 3, 1991, at A8, col. 4 (recommending that banks be given opportunity to make
more money by permitting them to enter new activities); Bacon, Bush Promises to Take
Lead in Pushing for Restructuring of Bank Regulations, Wall St. J., Nov. 30, 1990, at
A16, col. 2 (President "pledge[s] to take 'a leadership role' in revamping bank laws in
order to strengthen the nation's financial system").
363. See Labaton, Administration Presents its Plan for Broad Overhaul of Banking,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1991, at D6, col. 1.
The banking regulations were basically formed by the passage of three acts. The Glass-
Steagall Act provided for separate commercial and investment banking structures. See
Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (1933). See generally M. Malloy, 2 The Corpo-
rate Law of Banks § 7.2 (1988) (explaining the reforms of the Act). The Bank Holding
Company Act generally mandated a broader separation of banking from commerce. See
12 U.S.C. § 1843. See generally M. Malloy, 2 The Corporate Law of Banks § 8.2.1
(1988) (discussing legislative history of the BHCA). Finally, the McFadden Act re-
stricted national banks from having branches that cross state lines. See McFadden Act of
1956, ch. 191, 44 Stat. 1224 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
The major thrust of the Treasury Department's reform proposal is to undo these regu-
lations. See Labaton, Congress Gets Bush Bank Plan, N.Y. Times, Mar. 21, 1991, at D6,
col. 6; Labaton, Administration Presents its Plan for Broad Ov-erhaul of Banking, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 6, 1991, at Al, col. 1.
364. See infra notes 370-373 and accompanying text.
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pends ultimately on the existence of a healthy banking system, ' 365 indus-
try reform is vital to keeping BIF solvent. The FDIC even suggests that
"deposit insurance reform should start with reform of [the] banking in-
dustry structure. ' 366
Currently, the commercial banking industry is not healthy.367 If the
industry were healthy, individual banks would be more profitable, fewer
banks would fail and BIF would face lower costs. The rising number of
bank failures, 36' even before a slowdown in the economy, indicates that
structural reform is needed to correct a problem with the industry's basic
structure. To this end, Chairman Seidman warned Congress that the
FDIC "can only hold the fort [in keeping BIF solvent] if we do substan-
tial restructuring of the industry. 369
The FDIC generally believes that the restrictions mandated by current
law may "not only [be] unnecessary but also actually harmful to the
banking industry. . . . [and that] the financial environment has been
changing to the detriment of the traditional banking business. '370 The
FDIC concludes that eliminating the current restrictions on banking
would help diversify risk and boost overall profitability.3 7' Moreover,
proponents of structural reform submit that their proposals would im-
prove the industry's ability to compete internationally.372 For example,
an indication of the significant lost opportunities under the current sys-
tem is the "notable absence" of United States banks in the European and
Japanese markets.373
Additionally, proponents of these proposals believe that reform can be
implemented without impairing BIF's viability. There are two bases for
this optimism. First, there is a general belief that the changes would
improve the industry's overall profitability and thus "in the long run
[may] reduce risks to the banks and, therefore, to [BIF]. ' 374 A House of
365. Seidman I, supra note 53, at 11.
366. Id. at 18 (emphasis added).
367. See generally supra notes 123-133 and accompanying text (discussing various in-
dications of the industry's health). See also Task Force of The House Banking Comm. on
the International Competitiveness of U.S. Financial Institutions, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 5
(Press Release 1990) [hereinafter Competitiveness Report] ("banking industry is under
substantial pressure and its general condition is weak").
368. See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
369. Labaton, Bank Law Overhaul Proposed, N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1990. at DI, col. 6.
370. Seidman I, supra note 53, at 12; see also Regulate Banks: Less, and More, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 10, 1990, at A18, col. 1 ("[Current banking laws] are suppose to make banks
safe. In fact, they do the opposite.").
371. See Seidman I, supra note 53, at 13.
372. See, e.g., id. (urging deregulation to make banks more competitive internation-
ally); Regulate Banks: Less, and More, N.Y. Times, Dec. 10, 1990, at A18, cols. 1-2
(same).
373. Competitiveness Report, supra note 367, at 8; see also Seidman I, supra note 53, at
13 (commenting that European market has nothing comparable to the Bank Holding
Act); Greenspan Testimony, supra note 210, at 11 (commenting on increasingly competi-
tive international environment).
374. Competitiveness Report, supra note 367, at 32.
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Representatives Task Force Report, although acknowledging the possi-
bility that reform could expose BIF to excessive liability in the short-
term, concluded that "the status quo carries clear risks of its own"' 75 and
that "the lack of diversification in the industry has imposed costs on
[BIF]. '3 76 Further, the FDIC suggests that there is "no valid reason" to
continue to limit the type of entities that can be bank affiliates. 31 The
only effect of such a limitation is to exclude an important source of capi-
tal--corporate business capital-from the banking industry. a7  The
FDIC also argues that the current laws deprive banks of the opportunity
to engage in "unfettered nationwide banking" through branching, which
is not only the free-market ideal but often the most economical way to
expand.3 79 Such interstate restrictions have "hampered [the banks' abil-
ity] to lower risk through diversification."3'3
Second, supporters of the reforms emphasize that banks wishing to
expand their operations could be forced to form separate affiliate enti-
ties,3"' which would ensure that BIF funds are adequately insulated from
the enhanced risks of the new activities.3 82 To enforce the separateness,
the FDIC has suggested that Congress give the bank supervisors en-
hanced powers to audit both sides of a transaction between a bank and its
affiliates that engage in the new activities.38 3 The separateness of the
banking entity would also be "fully disclosed and criminally
375. Id. at 33.
376. Id.
377. Seidman I, supra note 53, at 13.
378. See Reform Hearings, supra note 157, at 18 (statement of Mr. Seidman, FDIC
Chairman). But see Bacon, Bank Reforms From Treasury Faulted by CBO, Wall St. J.,
Mar. 6, 1991, at A10, col. 2 ("no convincing arguments have been advanced to indicate
that there are major advantages to be achieved by ownership that combines banking and
nonfinancial activities.") (quoting CBO Director Robert Reischauer).
379. Seidman I, supra note 53, at 16.
The Treasury Department estimates that banks in several states would save five to ten
billion dollars by using a single computer system. See Rosenbaum, Bank Plan's Gains
Are All Long Term, N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1991, at D6, col. 2.
380. Seidman I, supra note 53, at 18.
The effect of these proposals on the dual banking system is unclear. See Considine, A
State Response to U.S. Treasury Department Proposals to Modernize the Nation's Banking
System, in Annual Survey of Financial Institutions and Regulation, The S&L Crisis:
Death and Transfiguration, 59 Fordbam L. Rev. S243 (1991). There are persuasive argu-
ments that the current proposals would result in the elimination of the state system, a
change that would ultimately be detrimental to banking in general. See id. These argu-
ments may resolve themselves, however, by allocating the manner of state control over
branches operating within its borders rather than by denying the branching of banks. See
id.
381. See, eg., Seidman I, supra note 53, at 15 (separation can be achieved by extending
existing safeguards to protect banks); Wayne, Key Man at Banking Crossroads, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 8, 1990, at D9, col. 4 (suggestion by Treasury Under Secretary that "banks
be allowed to engage in a broad range of financial activities" as long as they are "sepa-
rately capitalized subsidiaries").
382. See Rosenbaum, Plan to Revamp Banking Laws Faces Obstacles, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 26, 1990, at D6, col. 5.




The arguments against expanding bank powers take two forms. For
convenience, these can be denominated the "paranoid" and "entitle-
ment" approaches. The "paranoid" argument, which Congress made,
suggests that deregulation of the savings-and-loan industry created the
need for a bailout.3"5 This argument confuses financial deregulation,
which permits banks to expand geographically and to offer new financial
devices, with supervisory deregulation, which frees the banks from the
regulator's control. The two are not inextricably intertwined. When
Congress implements financial deregulation, which is essential for the
commercial banking industry to return to profitability, it should simulta-
neously increase the regulator's supervisory powers, which would mini-
mize the potential for abuse.
The entitlement argument suggests that those advocating change
should have the burden of proving the need to eliminate the current legal
structure because "[b]anks are special. '3 86 This argument contends that
the present banking structure has been successful in protecting the
United States economy from disruption and that the proposed changes
would merely add risk.387 Therefore, there is no justification for re-
forming the system.3"' The burden of the argument for change has been
met, however. Although the present structure has prevented bank runs,
the industry is unhealthy.38 9 The tremendous cost of the savings-and-
loan crisis has shown that an unhealthy banking industry can impose an
384. Id.
385. See Note, Causes of the Savings and Loan Debacle, in Annual Survey of Financial
Institutions and Regulation, The S&L Crisis: Death and Transfiguration, 59 Fordhan L.
Rev. S301, S316-17 (1991); see also Regulate Banks: Less, and More, N.Y. Times, Dec.
10, 1990, at A1S, col. 1 (deregulation is "sure to be ridiculed by members of Congress"
because of S&L bailout).
[P]oliticians are so gun-shy after the savings and loan experience that ...
promises [claiming that deregulation can be implemented safely] may be insufli-
cient. Representative Charles E. Schumer, an influential Democrat on the
House Banking Committee, believes this could be the legislation's Achilles'
heel. A liberal from Brooklyn, Mr. Schumer is normally an Administration
antagonist, but he expects to be a strong supporter of the banking legislation.
"Even if it's carefully structured," he said, "even if it avoids all the problems of
the S.&L.'s, someone gets up on the floor and says this is the S.&L. crisis all
over. You have shivers down the spine of Congress people, and they run for the
doors."
Rosenbaum, Plan to Revamp Banking Laws Faces Obstacles, N.Y. Times, Dec. 26, 1990,
at D6, col. 5; see also Case, Deregulation: Invitation to Disaster in the S&L Industry, in
Annual Survey of Financial Institutions and Regulation, The S&L Crisis: Death and
Transfiguration, 59 Fordham L. Rev. S93 (1991) (suggesting that deregulation was in fact
the cause of the S&L crisis).
386. Burstein, Banking System Safeguards Should Not Be Dismantled, Am. Banker,
June 7, 1990, at 4, col. 2.
387. See id. at 15, col. 5.
388. See id.
389. See supra notes 123-133 and accompanying text; see also Quint, Experts Suggest
Laws for an Ailing Bank System, N.Y. Times, Jan. 1, 1991, at 42, col. I ("We have more
than enough evidence that the banking system is breaking down ....").
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enormous cost on the economy. Further, changes that make the financial
services industry healthier would presumably lead to more efficient avail-
ability of funds for future economic growth. Finally, because these
changes would be implemented without increasing the risks on the bank-
ing entity, the industry would continue to be free from bank runs.
The ability to offer a wider range of products, combined with stronger
regulatory oversight, would permit the banks to be more competitive
without necessarily imposing greater risks on the banking entity. There-
fore, structural reform of the industry is essential to the industry's health,
and correspondingly to the viability of the insurance fund.
CONCLUSION
To answer the question posed by this Note's title, BIF is in serious
financial trouble, and Congress may be facing the very real danger that it
will have to compel the taxpayers to make yet another rescue, this time
of the commercial banking industry.
While the painful experience of the savings-and-loan debacle must be
remembered, Congress must act swiftly to correct the structural
problems of the banking industry. In order to survive in today's world
economy, banks must be permitted to diversify their portfolios and offer
innovative financial devices. Thus, Congress must free the banks from
the shackles of the Depression-era laws.
Permitting this much-needed industry expansion, however, should not
affect the insurance fund adversely as these freedoms would be imple-
mented with significant safeguards. To gain the benefits, the banks will
face stricter supervision from regulators and be required to increase their
capital.
Additionally, while Congress must reform the deposit-insurance sys-
tem, its changes will be in vain if the industry that BIF insures is not
permitted to regain its profitability. Deregulation, not to be confused
with lack of supervision, should give the banks the strength to return to
health. If Congress refuses to act, a future Note will probably need to be
written on the Commercial Bank Bailout Bill of 1992.
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